



Greater Horn of Africa Peace Building Project

USAID/REDSO REGIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 6: ENHANCED CAPACITY FOR MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE REGION

TECHNICAL REPORT

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ACRONYMS

ADRA	Adventist Development Relief Agency
APFO	Africa Peace Forum
AU-IBAR	Africa Union's InterAfrican Bureau for Animal Resources
BYDA	Bahr-al-Gazal Youth Development Agency
CAPE	Community-Based Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology of AU-IBAR
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWERU	Conflict Early Warning Response Units
CIFA	Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance
CMG	Conflict Prevention and Management
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPMR	Conflict Prevention Mitigation and Response
CPAF	Conflict Pilot Activities Fund
CQUICK	Conflict Quick Response Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CVA	Conflict Vulnerability Assessment
EAC	East African Community
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development (Horn of Africa)
ISGM	Institutional Strengthening and Grant Making program
FAN	Forest Action Network
FEWER	Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FORDIA	concern FOR Development Initiatives in Africa
GHA	Greater Horn of Africa
GL	Great Lakes
GLEWN	Great Lakes Early Warning Network
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ISGM	Institutional Strengthening and Grant Making Program
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KC	Karamojong Cluster
LEAT	Lawyers Environmental Action Team
MWENGO	Mwelekeo wa NGO
NGO	Non-governmental organization
MSI	Management Systems International
NAP	National Agenda for Peace
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NCKK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OCA	Organizational Capacity Assessment
PACT/MWENGO	Private Agencies Collaborating Together and MWENGO
PELUM	Participatory Ecological Land Use Management Association
RCMG	Regional Conflict Management and Governance Team - REDSO/ESA
RECONCILE	Resource Conflict Institute
REDSO/ESA	Regional Economic Development Services Office/East and Southern Africa
RF	Results Framework
RWN	Rwanda Women Network
SO	Strategic Objective
ST	Southern Tier
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASDA	Wajir South Development Association

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT GLOSSARY

Intermediate Result (IR) An important result that is seen as an essential step to achieving a Strategic Objective (SO). IRs are measurable results that may capture a number of discrete and more specific results. IRs may also help to achieve other IRs.

Performance Indicator A particular characteristic or dimension used to measure intended changes defined by a Results Framework. Performance indicators are used to observe progress and to measure actual results compared to expected results. Performance indicators help answer how or if an Operating Unit or SO Team is progressing towards its objective, rather than why such progress is or is not being made. Performance indicators may measure performance at any level of a Results Framework (Strategic Objective level or Intermediate Results level).

Performance Management Plan (PMP) A tool used by an Operating Unit and SO Team to plan and manage the process of assessing and reporting progress towards achieving a Strategic Objective. Known as a “performance monitoring plan” until 2002.

Strategic Objective (SO) The most ambitious result that a USAID Operating Unit, along with its partners, can materially affect, and for which it is willing to be held accountable. SOs can be designed for an Operating Unit to provide analytic, technical, logistical, or other types of support to the SOs of other Operating Units (whether bilateral, multi-country, or global in nature).

Source: <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ads/glossary.pdf>

USAID/REDSO REGIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 6: ENHANCED CAPACITY FOR MANAGING CONFLICTS IN THE REGION

TECHNICAL REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under the **Greater Horn of Africa Peacebuilding Project**, USAID REDSO/ESA Regional Conflict Management and Governance Team (RCMG) worked closely with MSI specialists to further develop the Performance Management Plan (PMP) and gather performance monitoring information from various stakeholders. The purpose of this exercise was to help USAID to better understand the results of RCMG's regional assistance and to assist in the preparation of the USAID Annual Report. The technical report that follows is a direct result of this process.

Section I provides an introduction and summary of the technical report, and provides insights on the decision to focus on the six Intermediate Result (IR) level indicators. Principal points learned during the process and in review of the IRs are presented here as well. A graphic representation of the relevant Strategic Objective concludes this section.

Section II provides the genesis and purpose of this report. Within this section is a brief history of the strategic planning process around the objectives related to conflict prevention, mitigation and response. This includes a discussion on the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative Strategic Plan, the relevant sections of the REDSO Strategy for 2001-05, revisions to Strategic Objective 6, and the RCMG team's future focus.

Sections III -V present information about the three Intermediate Results and their indicators. The three Intermediate Results are: 1) Capacity of African-Owned Conflict Management Organizations Strengthened; 2) Expanded Application of Effective Approaches in Managing Conflict and 3) Increased Networking Among CMG Stakeholders. Sections III-V discuss the results, including those attained and those not captured by the indicators. Within this section are analyses of the data, suggestions for refinement of the indicators, and comments on the data quality.

Section VI provides general comments and suggestions on several Strategic Objective-level topics. This section lists topics for the Annual Report Narrative, suggests a number of ways to expand the team's work beyond their current areas of operation, and recommends ways for organizing their performance monitoring work for next year's Annual Report. Herein are highlights of the RCMG team's previous contributions to USAID Missions in the region.

Section VII comments on the two Strategic Objective-level indicators included in the Performance Data Table and suggestions for a number of revisions.

Annex. The materials provided in the Annex provide important reference material that bring to life the performance of the activities. Documents included in the Annex include relevant success stories, activity documentation, listings of breakthrough publications in Conflict Prevention Mitigation Response (CPMR), and partner websites.

USAID/REDSO REGIONAL STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 6: ENHANCED CAPACITY FOR MANAGING CONFLICTS IN THE REGION

PERFORMANCE RESULTS FOR FY 2002 TECHNICAL REPORT

I. Introduction and Summary Points

In 2002, under the **Greater Horn of Africa Peacebuilding Project**, Management Systems International (MSI) was asked by the USAID REDSO/ESA Regional Conflict Management and Governance Team (RCMG) to field one international and one local consultant to help their team gather performance monitoring information to better understand the results of previous activities. The information was also used in the preparation of the USAID Annual Report (presented in early 2003).

In June 2000, a number of indicators were identified for possible use in the Performance Management Plan (PMP) of the Conflict Management sector.¹ In the course of implementation, six indicators emerged as being efficient, effective and timely in providing information for management and reporting tools for the three intermediate results. The Nairobi based REDSO/RCMG Team, following guidance from USAID Washington, asked MSI to concentrate on these selected indicators (*see Annex 2 for the performance data table*). Meetings with REDSO/ESA team members resulted in a decision to focus on the six Intermediate Result (IR) level indicators rather than collecting data for the two Strategic Objective level indicators (due to time constraints).

The MSI team conducted interviews with all available RCMG team members and a representative group of African organizations involved in conflict management (*see Annex 1 for persons and organizations consulted*). The MSI team's work are presented in the following order:

- Results at the level of each of the three intermediate results;
- Performance tables and data for each indicator under the IRs with suggestions and refinements of the indicators and discussion of data quality issues;
- General comments and suggestions, as requested by the RCMG Team Leader, on several SO-level topics; and
- Comments and suggestions on the two Strategic Objective -level indicators included in the Performance Data Table.

Additionally, there are a number of documents provided in the Annexes with further detail for the reader, including success stories which illustrate the effects of the activities (*see Annex 3*).

¹ See the performance measurement glossary for definition of PMP, Indicators, Intermediate Results, Strategic Objectives.


The principal points that RCMG and the MSI Team wishes to emphasize from the report are as follows:

- Because of the past and current work under its conflict SO, the RCMG Team has established a foundation for more effective management of conflict by African organizations. The principal aspects of this work includes: (1) capacity building of intergovernmental, government and civil society African organizations and individuals in conflict management; (2) implementation and focusing of conflict activities on the ground using effective approaches in three targeted conflict zones; (3) completion of substantial analytic work leading to new approaches to conflict management; (4) reorientation of regional intergovernmental organizations (IGAD, COMESA, and EAC) to work in partnership with civil society and business in addressing regional conflict; and (5) extending information and communications technologies (ICT) to establish quick response capabilities of regional conflict management networks.
- Success over the period has been documented. At the formal governmental level, two regional organizations – the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) have been realigned to begin taking on the function of intergovernmental platforms for conflict management in the region. IGAD has been called upon to help support Sudan peace talks and to convene the Somali peace talks – both with some financial assistance from REDSO. Following agreement by member state to protocols guiding action, a Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism is being established under the leadership of IGAD that provides a regional framework for governmental and civil society collaboration on conflict management in the Horn. A critical next step is working with IGAD member states, initially Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, to establish offices: first at the national level, then in key local offices along conflict prone borders, to systematically address issues of conflict early warning and response.
- The REDSO/RCMG team is succeeding in focusing its conflict management activities on three targeted conflict zones and on a limited set of effective approaches in managing conflict. As discussed above, this trend has been a very high priority, and will accelerate in FY2003. At the informal level, nine organizations that received institutional strengthening under the Institutional Strengthening and Grant Making (ISGM) program of the Horn of Africa Project (HASP) achieved the desired progress and had significant impact on respective communities served. Most of these have significant activities in one or more of the three zones. In addition, a number of civil society organizations working with REDSO funds have applied at least one effective approach toward conflict prevention and mitigation in the region. Many of these, particularly over the past year, have been targeted for one of the conflict zones. REDSO-funded training courses for organizations involved with conflict management (over the calendar year) increased from two to eleven.
- There was measurable progress in a number of key areas. One important intermediate result is the number of reports and analysis that have been found useful by relevant audiences within the respective zones – referred to as “disseminated reports.” There were five disseminated reports in the calendar year, up from two in 2001, with the expectation that a

similar number will be produced in 2003. This report also includes data on effective approaches employed by organizations funded through ISGM, implemented under a contract with PACT/MWENGO and two other RCMG grant-making programs, the Conflict Pilot Activities Fund (CPAF) and the Conflict Quick Response Fund (CQUICK). Lastly, networking activities of the target organizations show an improvement from 2001 – as an example, there were two network meetings in the year that brought together representatives from over 50 organizations from seven of the Greater Horn of Africa countries.

- One of the highest priority tasks facing the RCMG team is completing baseline analysis/data collection and data quality assessment on certain indicators. Baseline analysis at the SO indicator level will require significant analytic work for determining criteria for:
 - Judging progress in achieving greater frequency/coverage of efforts to manage conflicts in the three targeted conflict zones (SO-level Indicator 2).
 - Identification of factors that contribute to conflict vulnerability in the targeted conflict zones (SO-level Indicator 3).

RCMG Strategic Objective and Intermediate Results (November 2001 version):



II. Background and Context

Greater Horn of Africa Initiative Strategic Plan

The current regional conflict management program emerged from the commitment that REDSO/ESA made to implementation of the Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI). In the GHAI Strategic Plan of November 1997, the Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response (CPMR) Strategic Objective was “African Capacity for Preventing, Mitigating and Responding to Conflict Strengthened.” Key intermediate results were: 1) Indigenous organizations responding to conflict strengthened; 2) Pilot activities tested to establish best practices; and 3) Effective regional mechanisms for responding to conflict supported.

REDSO Strategy 2001 – 2005

REDSO’s new strategy was drafted in June 2000. The document highlighted progress in all Intermediate Results over the period 1997-2000.

“REDSO has established a working relationship with GHAI coordinators in the bilateral missions to promote a regional approach to conflict prevention, mitigation, and response. REDSO has also created several regional funds for use by bilateral missions and partners for addressing conflict management issues. These include the Conflict Pilot Activities Fund (CPAF), the Conflict Quick Response Fund (CQUICK), and the Institutional Strengthening and Grant Making (ISGM) program.

A Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism is in the initial design stages at IGAD, with REDSO and GTZ support, which aims to link civil society and government in an information grid with a key partner being the Africa Peace Forum through the Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). In support of COMESA’s nascent Court of Justice, REDSO has supplied equipment and funded a fact-finding trip of COMESA representatives to investigate trade-related claims made by Ethiopia and Eritrea in association with their ongoing conflict. REDSO supported analyses and workshops to discuss a Peace Protocol for Peace and Security for COMESA member states. Following review by member state officials and Cabinet Ministers, this outline was discussed at length in a closed session at the recent Heads of State meetings in Mauritius in May 2000.”²

The CPMR Strategic Objective and performance framework for the new strategy remained essentially unchanged from the 1997 version. In the 2000 version, the three Intermediate Results focused on: 1) Strengthening civil society organizations active in CPMR; 2) Developing and testing CPMR effective approaches, and 3) Creating CPMR platforms and frameworks, led by intergovernmental agencies, to ensure rapid and authoritative communication and consensus building among CPMR stakeholders at all levels.

“The combination of the three distinct but interrelated IRs working together would significantly increase the chances that conflicting forces could be steered into

² REDSO Strategy 2001 – 2005, pp 56-57

appropriate channels, that ongoing violent conflicts could be subdued, and that the effects of such conflicts would not lead to violent repetition.”³

By focusing on capacity strengthening, REDSO aimed to contribute ultimately to a more just and peaceful development in the region. One key aspect of developing synergy between a multi-tiered system of interstate, state, and civil society organizations has been an increase in the velocity and density of CPMR-relevant information – and the subsequent sharing of the information to a wide range of actors. This synergy can, therefore, enable commitment and political will engendered for multi-tiered CPMR and track one diplomacy.

SO 6 Revision

In November 2001, the overall strategy was revised to reflect the best practices that REDSO/ESA has compiled during the previous for years, yet the revised SO remains for the most part unchanged: “Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region.” The revisions that were made fall in the following categories:

Geographic focus. With USAID/Africa guidance, the team focused funding on three conflict prone cross-border zones: 1) Great Lakes, 2) Karamoja Cluster, and 3) south Ethiopia/northeast Kenya/southwest Somalia. The latter two include most of the cross-border northern arc of Kenya’s remote, arid border. These two zones also comprise the two focal areas for initial implementation of the Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism referred to above and explained in more detail below (*see Annex 8 for a representation of the information flow of CEWARN*). The third zone (Great Lakes) includes the conflict prone borders of Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and potentially key borders of two other states in the Great Lakes region. (*see the map showing the three cross border zones immediately following this section*).

Targeting fewer organizations. The number and range of organizations to receive specific assistance for institutional strengthening was to be reduced.

Three effective approaches. Working with a consulting team of experts, and building on a set of case studies in the region, the team narrowed the list of effective approaches to three for priority emphasis in funding decisions.

Linkages between stakeholders. The revised plan emphasized that most important for effective conflict early warning and response is a comprehensive approach – achieved by fostering linkages between regional intergovernmental organizations, governments, and civil society, in a variety of forms (*see Annex 3: success stories, and Annexes 4A and 4B*).

Progress to Date & Future Focus

This report documents substantial progress on the first, third and fourth objectives listed above. The second objective, reducing the number of organizations receiving targeted institutional strengthening, has not yet been achieved as intended. In part, this is because the RCMG team has “inherited” for oversight a number of organizations providing food security services under the

³ REDSO Strategy 2001 – 2005, p.55

institutional strengthening part of the ISGM program. It is also due to an increase in the number of organizations that have established capacity for conflict management, such as AU-IBAR, which initiates veterinary services with local-level peace dialogues in pastoralist areas.


Over time, the RCMG team intends to proportionally reduce institutional strengthening support for civil society organizations (CSOs) involved in conflict management at the local level and shift these resources to CSOs playing a prominent role in implementing regional conflict management systems (such as those led by IGAD and COMESA). This will not diminish the RCMG Team's focus on helping to develop networks and encouraging a wide range of members, whether governmental or non-governmental. In tandem with building networks, RCMG will collaborate with host governments and USAID bilateral Mission offices, to help establish intergovernmental platforms and regional conflict management frameworks functioning at the regional, national, and local (cross-border) levels.

This shift in support will continue to help strengthen IGAD's pivotal role as a high-level regional platform for conflict management in the Horn. Building a framework for conflict early warning and response along the borders of five of IGAD's member states requires vision, patience, commitment and financial resources. The border areas serve as a buffer zone along the national boundaries of the more-or-less stable states of Kenya and Uganda, and their troubled neighbors, including the failed states of Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia. It is reassuring that IGAD's recent increased role in helping to support the Sudan peace talks and convene the Somalia peace talks (with some financial assistance from USAID as well as other donors), is paying dividends. With the appointment of the Director of the AFPO⁴ as Special Envoy for the Somali Peace Talks, the linkages between civil society and government leaders are strengthening.

Similarly in the Great Lakes, all five countries face armed conflict in-country and/or on their borders, including Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. In the future, additional RCMG assistance will also help develop a regional intergovernmental platform to address conflict management issues in the Great Lakes. Modeling its success in playing a leading role in the creation and establishment of CEWARN, RCMG will seek to help replicate (to the extent feasible) a similar process and equally rewarding partnership with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to build a comparable regional platform and framework for action on conflict management issues. Experience with IGAD demonstrates that it takes considerable time and commitment to develop a framework for conflict management in which national leadership at the highest levels has ownership; nonetheless, the effort is worth the result. A high RCMG priority will be to develop a gradual approach by a multi-tiered group of conflict management stakeholders in the Great Lakes region that can work with governments and intergovernmental organizations to provide a framework for multi-tiered conflict management and, potentially, formal government-sponsored (track one) diplomacy.

⁴ AFPO is a RCMG regional partner.

CROSS BORDER ZONES - REDSO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT GOVERNANCE OFFICE



○ Target Cross Border Conflict Zones



III. Intermediate Result 6.1: Capacity of African-Owned Conflict Management Organizations Strengthened

A. Overall Results at the IR Level

Largely because of the on-going activity of ISGM, much progress has been made in building capacity of African NGOs that work in conflict management. (*see Annex 4A for details.*) Nine organizations that received institutional strengthening from ISGM not only made the desired progress in institutional strengthening but also had significant impact on the respective communities served. Progress in FY 2002 has continued through ISGM institutional strengthening activities and through training in conflict management by a number of intergovernmental organizations (IGAD and COMESA) and NGOs, such as the African Peace Forum and FORDIA (Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa).

USAID grants to NGOs through the CPAF and CQUICK activities for conflict work have emphasized specific conflict activities. (*see Annex 4B for details.*) Moreover, that experience has increased recipient organizations' ability to plan, manage, and monitor more ambitious conflict mitigation activities and particularly those involving the identified "effective approaches" in conflict management. The third round of ISGM grants for FY 2003 does not include institutional strengthening by guidance from REDSO, an outcome in line with one of the four changes made under the revised RCMG strategy referred to above. Therefore, formal institutional development will neither take place nor be measured under the ISGM Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool (OCAT). However, as in the case of CPAF and CQUICK grant recipients, the third round of grants to conflict NGOs will lead to greater capacity of the recipients to plan and implement conflict management activities (*see Annex 4B, CPAF/CQUICK Activities*).

Results not captured in indicators. The existing indicators for IR 6.1 are not capturing at least two areas of capacity building in African conflict NGOs. The first area not captured relates to potential linkages of CPMR activities to activities and organizations not primarily involved with achieving CPMR results. For example institutional capacity building to strengthen regional intergovernmental organizations that are playing a key role in the regional early warning and early response systems is not fully captured. Secondly, the existing indicators do not measure institutional strengthening where PACT/MWENGO and other network organizations like the Africa Peace Forum (APFO) are providing NGOs with training and technical assistance without direct grant funding.

B. Indicator 1 -- Number of targeted regional organizations demonstrating change on the index of organizational strengthening

Results under Indicator 1. During the 2001 baseline period, five CPMR organizations received institutional strengthening from ISGM. These include Africa Peace Forum (APFO), Bahr-al-Gazal Youth Development Agency (BYDA), Forest Action Network (FAN), Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) and Rwanda Women's Network (RWN). All five organizations were taken through an Organizational Capacity Assessment (OCA) at the beginning of the grant period, that assessed all five at the nascent stage. The organizations were evaluated in six areas:

governance, management systems, human resources, financial resources, service delivery and external relations. The aim of ISGM was to move these organizations to the emerging stage by the end of the grant period in 2003, with confirmation by an additional end-of-grant OCA. Progress assessments were done for these organizations in 2001 and 2002 to assess the progress towards attaining the goal in all six areas. The results from all organizations assessed are recorded as a median score (*see also Annex 3: success stories, C. ISGM Notable Field Achievements/Results*).

During CY2002, four other organizations (CIFA, LEAT, PELUM and WASDA), which were previously categorized as food security organizations, successfully realigned their activities to focus on conflict prevention and mitigation after finding it difficult to implement food security activities due to prevailing conflicts in the region. CIFA, for example, has a food security mandate in Ethiopia, but was unable to conduct any activities in the area until after they involved the communities in peace talks. The organizations have learned that progress in food security development would require investment in sustainable peace and security. These organizations have now integrated CPMR activities into their programming and strategic planning.

Following are two tables for IR 6.1. The first table shows the results of the full OCA while the second table shows the results of the progress assessment (mini-OCA). The OCA, which was conducted at the beginning of the grant period (2001) and will be repeated at the end of the grant period (2003), has a different scale from the mini-OCA, which is a progress assessment.^{5 & 6}

OCA (beginning of the grant period)

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflicts in the Region						
Intermediate Result 6.1: Capacity of African owned Conflict Management Organizations strengthened						
Indicator 1	Unit of measure	Categories	Baseline Data	Target and Actual		
			2001	2002 Target	2002 Actual	2003 Target
Number of target regional organizations demonstrating change on the index of organizational strengthening (OCAT) developed by PACT/MWENGO	OCAT Index	Governance	1.8	N/A	N/A	2.4-3.5
		Mgmt systems	1.6	N/A	N/A	2.4-3.5
		Human Resources	1.4	N/A	N/A	2.4-3.5
		Financial Resources	1.5	N/A	N/A	2.4-3.5
		Service Delivery	1.8	N/A	N/A	2.4-3.5
		External Relations	1.9	N/A	N/A	2.4-3.5
	OCA Index (mean of the medians)	All categories	1.7	N/A	N/A	2.4-3.5

⁵ Please note that the 2001 results do not include RECONCILE which had just started activities; while in 2002 the result do not have the assessment of RWN, which was not assessed as they had not completed their grant requirements.

⁶ Please note also that the PIR Sheet suggest that we disaggregate by organizations and by categories. PACT/MWENGO does **not** release these scores by organizations because this is confidential and this would be a breach of agreement with the respective organizations. We have therefore only disaggregated by categories.

The OCA, which is administered at the start-up and closing of the grant period, is therefore not conducted nor reported annually. The mean result from all six categories is 1.7. A score of 1.0-2.3 indicates that the organizations are at a nascent stage while a score of 2.4-3.5 indicates that the organizations are at an emerging stage. A final OCA will be carried out in 2003 and it is anticipated that these organizations will move from being at the nascent stage of development to the emerging stage.

Mini-OCA (Interim progress assessment)

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflicts in the Region						
Intermediate Result 6.1: Capacity of African owned Conflict Management Organizations strengthened						
Indicator 1	Unit of measure	Categories	Baseline Data	Target and Actual		
			2001	2002		2003
				Target	Actual	Target
Number of target regional organizations demonstrating change on the index of organizational strengthening (OCAT) developed by PACT/ MWENGO	Median score (Mini-OCA)	Governance	2.0	2.0-2.9	2.4	N/A
		Mgmt systems	1.8	2.0-2.9	2.2	N/A
		Human Resources	1.8	2.0-2.9	2.4	N/A
		Financial Resources	1.8	2.0-2.9	2.3	N/A
		Service Delivery	2.3	2.0-2.9	2.5	N/A
		External Relations	2.3	2.0-2.9	2.3	N/A
	(mean of the medians)	All categories	2.0	2.0-2.9	2.4	N/A

The mean values for the median figures for the baseline year and the actual in 2002 are calculated as 2.0 and 2.4 respectively. A median score (1.0 – 1.9) indicates that the progress of the grantee is below expectation (2.0 – 2.9) indicates progress as expected, (3.0 – 3.9) indicates progress better than expectation *during the fiscal year* and (4.0) shows progress surpassing expectation *throughout the life of the grant*. In CY2002, the organizations progressed as desired in all six categories – a marked improvement from the previous year where progress made in the development of management systems, human resources and financial management was below expectation. There was an overall improvement from a median score of 2.0 in 2001 to 2.4 in 2002.

Data quality. The data collected and provided by ISGM generally meets USAID data quality standards. The methods for data collection are systematic and well documented. Because the same tool and measure is used consistently from organization to organization and also for one organization at the start and again at the close of the grant, there exist reliable measures to gauge the stage of organizational development and the progress being made by the organization.

C. Indicator 4b – Number of conflict training courses (workshops) conducted annually

Various USAID-sponsored organizations have conducted conflict workshops and courses. During the year, 11 training courses were conducted by USAID grantees and approximately 250

individuals from at least 60 organizations were trained (*see Annex 3: success stories, for further details on trainings provided*).

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region						
Intermediate Result IR 6.1: Capacity of African Owned Conflict Management Organizations						
Indicator 4b	Unit of measure	Zone	Baseline	Target and Actual		
			2001	2002		2003
				Target	Actual	Target
Number of training courses by target organizations	Number of courses	Conflict zone	2	3	11	11
		Outside zone	0	1	0	1

Below is the tabulated raw data:

Source	2001	2002 Target	2002 Actual	2003 Target
IGAD (CEWARN)	0	0	1	2
IGAD (Gender)	0	0	1	4
COMESA	0	0	1	3
PACT/MWENGO	2	2	6	1
CQUICK	0	1	2	1
Outside zone	0	1	0	1

Most of the courses were targeted at organizations that traditionally do peace work in conflict zones, but it is worth noting that USAID targeted a less traditional audience in 2002 through two regional bodies, IGAD and COMESA. The IGAD Women's desk conducted training in Advanced Negotiation and Mediation for Ministers in Charge of Women's Affairs in IGAD member states. Other members of parliament and government officials were also involved. The workshop resulted in a recommendation from trainees involved to extend the training into all IGAD countries in order to reach more officials.

For the first time, COMESA selected targeted Members of Parliament from the region. An outcome of the meeting was a recommendation by the parliamentarians to form a network for MPs from the COMESA region that would work toward conflict prevention and mitigation in the region through sharing of information.

It is intended that persons trained pass on the skills learned in training to their respective organizations and ultimately to the communities that they represent. The impact of these trainings therefore would a multiplier effect that cannot be fully enumerated, however, field data collection should capture this.

Data quality. The workshop training reports that RCMG receives (with lists of participants) should document the training experiences for future audits. A formal data quality assessment is needed.

IV. Intermediate Result 6.2: Expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflict

A. Overall Results at the IR level

Even in this first year of the life of the revised Conflict Management SO, the range and number of targeted organizations carrying out conflict management work in the targeted conflict zones combined with the number and range of conflict analyses and studies are impressive. (*see Annex 5*.) Through analysis and practice, the RCMG team has developed testable hypotheses on what works and doesn't work in particular conflict situations and therefore has made reasonable progress, given the age of the SO, in defining effective approaches for managing conflict. More telling, the suggested summary indicator table for Indicator 1 shows progressive focusing of conflict management activities in the targeted conflict zones versus activities outside these zones.

Analyses and studies carried out through RCMG support are making important contributions in three ways. First, the Conflict Vulnerability Assessments (CVAs), which are done as a service to USAID bilateral Missions, are helping USAID Missions strengthen conflict programs and understand how conflict dynamics work in affecting their development programs and conversely, how their development programs affect conflict. Second, RCMG supported studies and published reports have enabled NGOs and intergovernmental organizations like IGAD to investigate a wide range of issues contributing to conflict. The dissemination and discussion of these works has included the involvement of other donors and national leadership in Rwanda. In the next several months, a similar process may be replicated in Ethiopia as well. Third, case studies funded by RCMG have analyzed what types of conflict management approaches work, where, how, and why, and so far identified three effective approaches of faith-based, media-based, and local problem-solving conflict management (*see also Annex 5*).

The challenge now is to continue to expand the number of recognized effective approaches in such areas as animal health; interventions by youth, women, and traditional elder groups; expanded use of ICT for networking, communication on emerging conflict, and parliamentary initiatives.

Results not captured in indicators. There are two areas of on-going conflict work that the current indicators do not measure and that the RCMG team may want to include in their Annual Report narrative. The first concern organizations like AU/IBAR that recently sent the RCMG team reports on ten separate conflict management activities but which are counted under the current indicator as one activity because they are carried out by a single organization. The second is growing cross-border involvement by NGOs funded by REDSO, an outcome not being measured under the indicators but an important element of programming in the border areas. A number of organizations have begun collaborating on joint development and peace dialogue activities with counterparts and NGOs in neighboring pastoral areas.

B. Indicators 1 (a – e): Number of targeted organizations (NGOs) applying one of three effective approaches (media, faith-based, and local problem solving) inside and outside the three cross-border conflict zones.

Indicators 1 a/b

Indicators 1 a/b look at the target groups applying an effective approach in one of three cross-border areas and outside these areas respectively. Each organization is only counted once irrespective on the number of approaches it applies. Similarly, where the organization operates in more than one zone, this IR counts only one of the zones.

Three specific approaches are considered in this intermediate result. All other approaches are considered as “other.” *Media*, where radio broadcasting and other media tools are used to promote peace; *faith*, where faith-based methods are employed; and, *local problem solving*, where conflicting communities establish dialogue through inter-community peace committees or meetings. Approaches classified as *other* include provision of activities such as the development of early warning systems, development-related activities to mitigate conflict, and impartation of skills such as conflict resolution, mediation, resource management, etc., that can be employed.

Below are two tables for indicators 1 a/b. The first disaggregates the figures by the different zones while the second combines the three conflict zones. Given activities with grantees already in the pipeline, it is expected that there will be a greater focus in the conflict zones in FY 2003.

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region						
Intermediate Result 6.2: Expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflict						
Indicator 1 a/b	Unit of measure	Zone	Baseline Value (2001)	2002		Target Value (2003)
				Target	Actual	
Number of target groups applying at least one effective approach in one of three cross border zones and outside zones	Number of target groups	Karamoja Cluster	2	1	2	7
		Southern Tier	2	2	4	6
		Great Lakes	1	2	5	3
		Outside	11	5	10	3

In summary:

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region						
Intermediate Result 6.2: Expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflicts						
Indicator 1 a/b	Unit of measure	Zone	Baseline Value (2001)	2002		Target Value (2003)
				Target	Actual	
Number of target groups applying at least one effective approach in one of three cross-border zones and outside zones	Number of target groups	Conflict Zone	5	5	11	16
		Outside	11	5	10	3

Indicator 1 c/d/e

Indicator 1c looks at the number of organizations applying a *faith-based approach* in the three geographic zones, indicator 1d considers organizations applying *local problem-solving approaches*, while indicator 1e considers the *media approach*. For the purposes of reporting, these three indicators are combined in one table. Below is a composite of the three indicators. Note that one target group can apply up to three different approaches in each of the zones:

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region						
Intermediate Result 6.2: Expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflicts						
Indicator 1 c/d/e	Unit of measure	Zone	Baseline Value (2001)	2002		Target Value (2003)
				Target	Actual	
Number of target groups applying effective approaches in the three cross-border zones and outside zones	Number of target groups	Karamoja Cluster	2	1	6	7
		Southern Tier	2	2	8	7
		Great Lakes	1	2	3	3
		Outside	12	5	15	3

In detail:

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region							
Intermediate Result 6.2: Expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflicts							
Indicator 1 c/d/e	Unit of measure	Zone	Methods	Baseline Value (2001)	2002		Target Value (2003)
					Target	Actual	
Number of target groups applying effective approaches in any of the three cross-border zones	Number of organizations	Karamoja Cluster	Faith based	0	0	1	3
			Problem solving	2	1	3	3
			Media	0	0	2	1
			Other	0	0	0	0
		Southern Tier	Faith based	0	0	1	1
			Problem solving	2	1	4	5
			Media	0	1	0	1
			Other	0	0	3	0
		Great Lakes	Faith based	0	1	2	1
			Problem solving	1	1	1	1
			Media	0	0	0	1
			Other	0	0	0	0
		Outside	Faith based	4	2	5	1
			Problem solving	7	2	6	1
			Media	1	0	1	1
			Other	0	1	3	0

Specific Organizations

Notations in brackets are approaches employed. Where an organization applies two or more approaches, the dominant approach is in bold (this is to assist in tabulating for IR6.2.1 a/b) where an organization can only be counted once. Similarly, where an organization operates in more than one zone it is inserted here with an asterisk for the zone that is less important.

Great Lakes (GL)

<u>Baseline</u>	<u>2002 (Actual)</u>	<u>2003 (Target)</u>
Women Partners (PS)	ADRA (F) Care Burundi (PS) APFO (Other – Early warning)	Other new (PS) Other new (M) Other new (F)

Karamoja Cluster (KC)

<u>Baseline</u>	<u>2002 (Actual)</u>	<u>2003 (Target)</u>
OAU IBAR (PS)	AU IBAR (PS/M)	AU IBAR (PS)
ADOL (PS)	Fewsnet (M) NCCCK(F/PS)	UJCC (F) NSCC (F) NCCCK (F) KISP (PS) New (PS) New (M)

S. Ethiopia/ NE Kenya/ SW Somalia (ST)

<u>Baseline</u>	<u>2002 (Actual)</u>	<u>2003 (Target)</u>
Wajir Peace (PS)	CIFA (PS/ F)	EDC (M)
CIFA (PS)	WASDA (PS/Other – development) NORDA (PS/Other – development) ALDEF (PS/ Other)	CIFA (PS/F) WASDA (PS) NORDA (PS) ALDEF (PS) New (PS)

Outside zone

<u>Baseline</u>	<u>2002 (Actual)</u>	<u>2003 (Target)</u>
NCCCK (F/PS)	NCCCK (F/ PS)*	Action (PS)
FAN (PS)	ITDG (PS)	New (F)
NSCC (F)	BYDA (PS)	New (M)
ITDG (PS)	Reconcile (PS)	
Friends of ND (PS)	UNICEF Somali (F)	
Dioceses of Uganda (F)	Rednet (F)	
Reconciliation (PS)	Action (PS)	
Somali Peace (PS)	NSCC (F/ PS)	
Cecore (M)	LEAT (PS/ M/ Other)	
Action (PS)	Pelum (Other)	
Acholi (F)	ISGM/MWENGO (F)	

PS: Problem Solving F: Faith Based M: Media

Recommendation. Problem solving has been by far the most frequently and widely used effective approach in 2001 and 2002 making up to more than half of all effective approaches employed (26 out of 46 approaches used). Among the most common pointers to this approach is the assistance in setting up or supporting new peace committees by target organizations. Data from ISGM alone shows that in 2001, one of the organizations (CIFA), was involved in supporting three new committees in Moyale and Marsabit, while in 2003, three organizations, (WASDA, CIFA and NORDA), were involved in supporting 41 new peace committees in

Marsabit, Moyale, and Wajir (Somalia and Ethiopia). In CY2003, several other new committees could receive support from the target organizations, such as committees that may be set up from CEWERU activities. It may be worthwhile to establish a baseline for these committees and track the activity as a sub-indicator. Results of the peace committees should be documented as well.

Data Quality. There is need to objectively define the “effective approaches” to ensure reliability, so that different people collecting the data will always come up with the same results. It is not very clear that this is the case. Secondly, it is not clear that the target organizations keep a record of all relevant activities, which means that some effective approaches being employed by target organizations may not have been recorded. The organizations should further send regular reports to either ISGM or RCMG in order to ensure that at any point in time current data is available. RCMG, however, intends to make regular visits to field activities of target organizations during FY2003 to verify that the approaches being employed in the field actually reflect the approaches as recorded.

IR6.2 Indicator 1a calls for a method to distinguish the importance of one approach as applied by an organization over another approach applied by the same organization. Similarly there is need to distinguish the importance of one zone over another where an organization operates in more than one zone.

Effects of ISGM Activities:

One objective of the ISGM institutional strengthening activity is to build organizational capacity to implement conflict management activities in the region. A visible result is the impact in the conflict prone border communities of Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. Five grantees operating in these areas helped in either setting up or developing peace committees affecting at least 50 communities, enabling dialogue between conflicting and hostile communities by facilitating at least nine meetings and conducting training on conflict resolution and resource management to select groups (*see Annex 3 Section C: success stories*).

Activity⁷	Measure	Grantee	Border community(ies) affected
Help in setting up peace committees at the border community	Number of communities affected	7 (WASDA) 1 (CIFA) 6 (CIFA) 4 (WASDA) 30 (NORDA) 6 (BYDA) 53	Kenya (into Somalia) Kenya (into Ethiopia) Kenya (into Ethiopia) Kenya (into Somalia) Kenya (into Ethiopia) South Sudan
Enable dialogue between hostile/ conflicting communities	Number of reconciliatory meetings	8 (CIFA) 1 (ALDEF) 9	Kenya (into Ethiopia) Kenya (into Somalia)
Skill building in conflict resolution and /or resource management	Training organizations	CIFA WASDA ALDEF NORDA BYDA	Kenya Kenya Kenya/Somalia

⁷ These activities are reported under the IR 6.1 Indicator 4b – training by organizations strengthened by USAID and IR 6.2 Indicator 1 – Number of organizations applying at least one effective approach in at least one of the conflict zones.

The institutional strengthening carried out under ISGM has also directly assisted the organizations in resource mobilization strategies. During the year, four of these organizations were able to attract funding of over \$1 million. The grantees directly attributed this success to the ISGM program:

“Prior to ISGM we had no plan or strategy for mobilizing resources. Now our board members and staff have the confidence and the skills to successfully raise funds”
– LEAT

Further, ISGM institutional strengthening activities have assisted the organizations in strategic planning, which may help secure additional funding.

C. Indicator 3: Number of reports/analyses disseminated

This indicator reflects the number of activities carried out and/or funded in order to 1) increase the body of analytical knowledge regarding conflict in the region, thus helping to build practitioner’s knowledge, and 2) to support bilateral missions in the regions with the design and implementation of their strategic plans, integrating conflict as a programmatic consideration.

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region					
Intermediate Result 6.2: Expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflicts					
Indicator 3	Unit of measure	Baseline Value (2001)	2002		Target Value (2003)
			Target	Actual	
Number of publications (CVAs, books, reports and analysis) disseminated broadly	Number of publications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness of Civil Society ... Early Warning and Conflict ... 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CVA Rwanda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CVA Rwanda CVA Burundi CVA KC Scarcity and Surfeit Somali SSIA Draft report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CVA Ethiopia CVA Tanzania CVA Great Lakes Cross-border study (Foley)

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region						
Intermediate Result 6.2: Expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflicts						
Indicator 3	Unit of measure	Disaggregation	Baseline Value (2001)	2002		Target Value (2003)
				Target	Actual	
Number of publications (CVAs, books and analysis) widely disseminated	Number of publications	Actual reports	2	1	4	4

Although the target set for 2003 is four reports, other publications which are anticipated include: CEWARN conflict situational analysis, Building a Foundation for the Promotion of Somali Women (UNICEF), and the ISGM training manual. All of these publications could fall within this category by the end of CY2003 depending on their utility. Several of the national case

studies presented in the *Scarcity and Surfeit* volume have been used by USAID in preparing analysis and documentation for REDSO staff, including: *Coffee and Conflict in Burundi*; *Land and Conflict in Rwanda*; and *Water, Oil and Conflict in Sudan*.

See below for a detailed tabulation of the individual reports by year. (also see *Annex 6: Table of Contents – Scarcity and Surfeit*; and *Annex 7: Table of Contents – Early Warning & Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa*).

Details of data for Indicator 3 of IR 6.2: Number of reports and studies disseminated

2001 Actual	2002 Actual	2003 Target
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives (MSI) • CEWARN book 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rwanda CVA • Burundi CVA • War Destroys, Peace Nurtures • MSI Report on Karamoja Cluster • Scarcity and Surfeit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tanzania CVA • Great Lakes Region CVA • Ethiopia CVA • Study of NE Kenya/ S. Ethiopia/Sudan (L. Foley) • CEWARN conflict situational series

List of individual reports (see Annex 5)

Indicator Recommendations. Although “number of reports and studies disseminated” was not an indicator approved during the Washington review of the refined SO, it merits inclusion as it enables the RCMG Team to demonstrate the breadth of analysis it is carrying out through its implementing partners. This body of analytic work is impressive and important for the conflict management community and for USAID Missions who need and have requested many of these assessments and studies. Over time, the RCMG Team will work with partners to expand reporting of results of this indicator.

Data Quality. There is a need to define “widely disseminated” and the means by which information is disseminated in order to ensure that different persons collecting the data come up with the same results. For instance, “widely disseminated” could be defined by the number of organizations that have added value to their CPMR work through the reference of the publication.

V. Intermediate Result 6.3 Increased Networking Among CMG Stakeholders

A. Overall Results at the IR level

Work under this IR has led to realignment of regional intergovernmental agencies that may help foster track-one (formal government) diplomacy of the type IGAD is involved in with regard to the Somali and Sudan peace talks. REDSO assistance has helped establish the regional Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) mechanism and funded programs that have enabled civil society, business, and government to work together within a regional framework. Increased networking among African NGOs and intergovernmental organizations has occurred through path-breaking applications of ICT to support networks of NGOs and years of work with regional intergovernmental organizations like IGAD the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, and the East African Community (EAC).

In December 2000 (FY 2001), IGAD members signed and agreed to the CEWARN protocol in Khartoum for a regional government-led mechanism that established partnership roles for civil society, business, and academia. Participants at the May 2002 Entebbe, Uganda meeting selected Addis Ababa as the site for the CEWARN and the office was established in November 2002. The next step in implementation of the CEWARN mechanism is formal ratification by all IGAD member states (two have ratified to date), establishment of national CEWARN offices, called CEWERUs and identification of a national research institution in each member state to participate in implementation of CEWARN in the pastoral pilot areas of the Karamoja cluster and Northeast Kenya, Southern Ethiopia and southern Somalia. (*see Annex 8: CEWARN Information Flow Chart*).

COMESA has recognized conflict as an impediment to development and trade. In FY2001, COMESA began considering creation of a civil society organization (CSO) and business desk in the COMESA Secretariat. In the May 2001 Cairo Summit, members agreed to a number of formal modalities and procedures for promoting peace and security in the region.

Once certification of the East Africa Community's (EAC) financial systems takes place, RCMG looks forward to providing direct assistance and working with parliamentarians in the East Africa Legislative Assembly, the EAC Court of Justice, and the EAC Secretariat on peace, security, and conflict issues.

In applying ICT systems to broaden the reach of African conflict management organizations, REDSO/RCMG is carrying out an ICT assessment of selected African conflict management partners and is developing a model for connectivity to enhance conflict mitigation capabilities. For NGOs like the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK), that have offices situated throughout the country, the model would extend Internet connectivity to regional NCCCK offices within Kenya combined with more flexible, wireless technologies to the community level. For network hubs like APFO, the model would enable APFO to host websites and provide other communication services to its network partners in the Great Lakes Region.

In 2002, two organizations, Africa Peace Forum (APFO) and Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM) held networking meetings that brought together 26 organizations from

seven countries in the Greater Horn of Africa. APFO organized a network meeting for members of the Great Lakes Early Warning Network (GLEWN), which met during the year in Nairobi. This brought together 21 participants from 20 organizations from seven countries, specifically, Rwanda (2), Burundi (2), Democratic Republic of Congo (2), Tanzania (3), Uganda (2), Sudan (3) and Kenya (7). The network was able to set an agenda for 2003 and identified priority areas, primarily capacity building and sharing conflict situation analysis type of reports. APFO has set up a website (through USAID-sponsorship in November 2002, and has dedicated two pages to the Great Lakes Early Warning Network. The website will carry information on the network activities, information on the respective network members and situation analysis reports. PELUM brought together 43 participants from 33 organizations in Kenya (25), Uganda (9) and Tanzania (9). The objective of the meeting was to develop a strategy for mitigating conflicts that impact on food security by developing specific action plans for each organization (*see Annex 9 for websites and hyperlinks for organizations named in this report*).

During 2002, ISGM assisted faith-based organizations in the region by setting up a network. ISGM was able to do this by taking advantage of the trips made to the respective countries during program implementation activities.

B. Indicator 1 – Adoption of formal instruments for CSOs to affiliate with intergovernmental bodies addressing conflict in the region

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region							
Intermediate Result 6.3: Increased Networking among stakeholders in CPMR							
Indicator 1	Unit of measure	Inter-governmental body	Baseline data	Target and Actual			
			2000	2001	2002		2003
				Actual	Target	Actual	Target
Adoption of formal instruments for CSOs to affiliate with intergovernmental bodies addressing conflicts	Number of protocols, rules and procedures	IGAD	0	1	1	2	2
		COMESA	0	1	1	1	2
		EAC	0	0	0	1	1

Indicator comments and refinements. The indicator as it stands and the reporting table above tend to under-report the achievements for both IGAD/CEWARN and COMESA because neither illustrates the difficulty and quantity of the preparatory work required within regional intergovernmental organizations before such formal instruments can be adopted. The significance of these efforts should not be lost (*see Annex 3 success stories*). The principal milestones leading to the fulfillment of each protocol or set of modalities should be captured in the narrative.

1. IGAD

The milestones leading to the creation of the CEWARN protocol are the following:

- 1999 – 2000: Development of Terms of Reference for a contract to help IGAD deal with conflicts more assertively.
- 2000: The London-based Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) contracted to design the Conflict Early Warning and Response mechanism or CEWARN.
- 2000: Recommendations made to draft a protocol that would call for each country to support early warning units (CEWERU).
- 2000: Draft protocol presented.
- December 2000: CEWARN draft protocol signed by all Member States.

Additional benchmarks to be reported are: the number of countries ratifying the CEWARN protocol annually, REDSO financial contributions to the Sudan and Somalia peace talks, and progress on the workplan under the contract awarded to the Swiss Peace Foundation for capacity building. A workshop was held in November 2002 to develop Early Warning indicators for conflicts in the cross-border pastoral zones, which include two of the RCMG team's three targeted conflict zones.

2. COMESA

COMESA decided that the use of protocols is not feasible because the process of ratification is difficult due to the number of member countries (20). The preference is hence to use modalities, which when accepted by the different countries are binding. The most significant steps made by COMESA in regard to peace and security include the following:

- Decision by Heads of State and Governments that Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet annually to consider modalities for priority in peace and security for the region;
- Decision to identify human and financial resources in the region; root causes of conflict in the region and any gaps that COMESA can fill toward enhanced peace and security in the region; and
- Decision to involve other stakeholders, such as NGOs, the business community, and Parliamentarians.

COMESA was also able to accomplish the following:

- Set up a study team (with reporting responsibilities) on peace and security;
- Conducted workshops to disseminate findings of the study (March 2000, February 2001 and April 2001);
- Prepared modalities for implementation of the COMESA program on peace and security; and,
- Decision by COMESA to give civil society an advisory role, including civil society desk at the COMESA secretariat.

The following are some of the benchmarks toward establishing a civil society desk at the COMESA secretariat (which could be noted in the annual report and hence form a basis of reporting in the 2003 annual report).

- Establishment of rules for the establishment of a civil society desk (in the process).
- Validation of the rules by civil society.
- Presentation to and endorsement by Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
- Physical establishment of office.

Following is a chronological list of actions taken by COMESA in broadening its role in promoting peace and security in the region:

- May 1999: The 4th Summit of COMESA Heads of States decided that Ministers of Foreign Affairs should meet at least once a year to consider modalities for promoting peace and security in the region;
- May 1999: COMESA sent a study team to identify root cause of conflicts in the region and the role that COMESA can play;
- May 2000: The 5th COMESA Summit undertook to involve other stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians and business communities involved in developing a policy on peace and security;
- May 2001 (Cairo Summit): The 6th COMESA Summit adopted a revised mandate for the COMESA program on peace and security; and
- In 2000 and 2001, COMESA made several decisions on the modalities of implementation of the program on Peace and security, which include:
 - A three tier structure for dealing with issues of peace and security;
 - The role of the Authority as the highest decision making body in matters of peace and security;
 - A decision for Ministers of Foreign Affairs to meet at least once a year to consider modalities for promoting peace and security in the COMESA sub-region;
 - The role of the COMESA secretariat in initiating action for conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy;
 - Cooperation with other organizations using existing cooperation instruments; and
 - Modalities on consultation with the private sector, and other civil society.

Training of COMESA region parliamentarians on conflict management has been reported under IR 6.1, Indicator 4, but should also be mentioned here because it shows a fulfillment of the recommendations made at the 4th COMESA Summit of Heads of States (May 1999). Since most of the other indicators being reported show FY2001 as the baseline year, the fact that the baseline year for this indicator is FY 2000 should be highlighted.

3. East African Community (EAC)

Little work and assistance has occurred with elements of the EAC because REDSO has not yet certified the EAC's financial systems to enable direct assistance. REDSO has however worked very well with EAC in the field of ICT. Assistance amounting to \$100,000 was extended to the

EAC, strengthening the computing and communication capability of the EAC Secretariat, the Court and the East African Legislative Assembly.

Data quality. The data collected represents formal decisions by regional intergovernmental institutions, which document fully their proceedings and decisions. Because of the sensitivity of dealing with different member countries, such data is generally reliable, accurate, detailed, and consistent over time. The type of data collected for the indicator – such as the number of protocols or procedures – is simple to record and leaves little room for error. However, because of the complex nature of adopting a single instrument for formal government ratification, the time required to complete major actions can extend over several years. Therefore, the RCMG Team may want to consider an indicator that tracks completion of interim milestones toward a formal step like adoption of a protocol.

We suggest that RCMG consider an indicator that would report both on benchmarks toward a formal decision by organizations like IGAD or COMESA and on the number of countries that have ratified the formal decision, such a protocol.⁸ Below is an example using the IGAD CEWARN protocol. Tracking the adoption and implementation of the COMESA modalities could be handled in a similar way.

Adoption of IGAD protocol on CEWARN (Sample Indicator)							
Indicator	Unit of measure	Adoption/ Ratification	Baseline data	Target and Actual			
			2000	2001	2002	2002	2003
				Actual	Target	Actual	Target
Adoption of CEWARN Protocol	Number of steps toward adoption of protocol	Adoption	0	3	2	2	3
Ratification of protocol by all member countries	Number of countries that have ratified	Ratification	0	7	2	2	2

C. Indicator 4b – Number of targeted network members with a CPMR website updated in the last 12 months.

Strategic Objective 6: Enhanced Capacity for Managing Conflict in the Region					
Intermediate Result 6.3: Increased Networking among Stakeholders in CPMR					
Indicator 4b	Unit of measure	Baseline data	Target and Actual		
		2001	2002		2003
			Target	Actual	Target
Targeted network members with a CPMR website updated in the last 12 months	Number of organizations	4	3	2	4

⁸ The number of major steps that must be taken before the protocol is signed should be outlined in the baseline year.

Individual Organizations

Organization	2001	2002		2003
	Baseline	Target	Actual	Target
APFO		1		1
AU-IBAR		1	1	
CEWARN				1
COMESA	1			
EAC	1			
FECCLAHA				1
IGAD	1			
NCCK		1	1	
PACT	1			
UJCC				1
TOTAL	4	3	2	4

Indicator recommendations or modifications. The RCMG Performance Data Table indicated use of Indicator 4a, "Percentage of targeted groups connected to the Internet." However, during interviews, the MSI team realized that most of the targeted organizations were already connected to the Internet and that a more robust indicator, Indicator 4b, would be more useful in showing the RCMG Team's progress in using ICT to increase networking among African conflict management organizations. There are several levels of connectivity that could be considered: (a) a dial-up e-mail connection; (b) dial-up connection to the internet; (c) existence of a website; (d) ability to host websites of network partners; and so on. The suggested indicator tracks the number of targeted organizations with a website updated in the last 12 months. The recommended indicator will measure a more restricted group of partner organizations – those that have received direct funding from USAID or under ISGM.

Data quality. No documentation of information on internet connectivity currently exists for baseline and actual FY2002 results. Such documentation is needed before the Annual Report is submitted and may be provided largely by the on-going ICT Assessment. The RCMG team should establish a plan for documenting the actual status of internet connectivity of the group of partners it is currently using for the indicator and then raise the bar as progress is made.

VI. SO-level Discussion

As requested by RCMG, the MSI team provided suggestions and general comments on three SO-level topics. These included: (1) points to make in the SO Annual Report narrative; (2) suggestions for moving conflict work under SO6 to a broader level with bilateral USAID Missions, with AFR/Washington and other parts of USAID/Washington, and with other USG Agencies, and (3) suggestions for organizing performance monitoring work for next year's annual report and RCMG contributions to USAID Missions in the region.

A. Suggested Points for the SO-level Annual Report Narrative

- **Foundation established for more effective management of conflict by African organizations.** Past and current work under the conflict SO has enabled the current SO to largely meet expectations through (1) capacity building of African organizations and individuals in conflict management; (2) implementation of many, varied conflict activities and approaches on the ground in three conflict zones; (3) completion of a substantial body of analytic work based on experience that is leading to new approaches to conflict management; (4) reorientation of regional intergovernmental organizations (IGAD, COMESA, and EAC) to serve as platforms in partnership with civil society and business in addressing regional conflict in the cross-border zones; and (5) extending information and communications technologies (ICT) to strengthen the response capability of regional conflict management frameworks, networks, and mechanisms such as CEWARN. Given these efforts, the RCMG team has completed most of the foundation work for more effective management of conflict by African organizations.
- **Focusing NGO conflict management activities on three targeted conflict zones.** Data on the expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflict over the past two years and plans for FY 2003 show clearly a progressive focusing of efforts on the three targeted conflict zones and on three effective approaches currently identified.
- **SO Indicator baseline analysis.** As the RCMG team completes the baseline setting for SO indicators 1 (frequency and coverage of conflict management efforts in the 3 conflict zones) and 2 (mitigation of factors driving conflict in the 3 conflict zones), future reviews of progress on these SO indicators will show progress toward SO achievement.
- **ICT for conflict management.** The initial and continuing work in ICT with intergovernmental and NGO partners will establish more rapid communication channels for members at formal governmental levels as well as among stakeholders in informal networks. This will mean that conflict management mechanisms will be able to respond more quickly; will have more time to prevent and mitigate disputes; and that new methods of managing conflict can be rapidly diffused throughout the Greater Horn and Great Lakes.
- **Linkages with other Sectors: Major achievements not being documented** through current performance monitoring include: (1) conflict capacity building in NGOs defined as *food security* NGOs under the ISGM program; (2) organizational strengthening by PACT/MWENGO and other regional organizations like the Africa Peace Forum (APFO)

through training and technical assistance without direct grant funding; and (3) achievements by COMESA, EAC and IGAD, facilitated by RCMG, in navigating the multitude of necessary procedural and organizational steps over the last two to three years required for more assertive involvement in promoting peace and security in their respective regions.

B. Suggestions for moving SO6 conflict work by REDSO/RCMG to a broader level

- **Baseline analysis at the SO level: the critical missing link.** To move conflict work forward effectively, RCMG must complete all outstanding baseline work, especially at the SO indicator level, with contract help as needed and with early, substantial involvement of regional partners.
- **Use the annual review of progress on the SO indicators** (especially the criteria for greater frequency and coverage of conflict management and the mitigation of conflict factors in the 3 conflict zones) to develop comprehensive, credible, and concrete information of changes and results at the SO level in the three targeted conflict zones.
- **Synthesis of analytic work.** Carry out a synthesis of the body of analytic work on conflict under REDSO's responsibility. Link that synthesis to the results framework (RF) and develop sub-intermediate results in the Results Framework. Hold a workshop to review the findings and lessons learned from the synthesis. Invite regional partners (NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and other USAID Missions) and USAID/Washington stakeholders (Africa Bureau, DCHA, PPC, and others) to participate in this workshop.
- **Continue organizational strengthening and seek additional funding for conflict management.** Seek to establish a new mechanism and secure additional funding for continuing of the organizational strengthening work of conflict organizations now carried out by the ISGM, CPAF and CQUICK programs. Work with ISGM to refine performance indicators that capture more completely the capacity-building work they are doing with so-called food security NGOs and the "other work" they are doing in training and technical assistance outside of direct grant funding to NGOs. A significant area of results is currently being missed in REDSO's performance reporting.
- **Christen new "effective" conflict management approaches with a deliberate, transparent method.** Through the annual reviews of results, on-going work with implementing partners, and the synthesis of analytic work, devise and test additional effective approaches in conflict management, like animal health (AU-IBAR), peace committees linking local government and civil society organizations across borders, and expansion of regional networking through ICT and assistance that reaches the community level.
- **Link the conflict SO6 to other REDSO SOs and to other USAID Mission SOs in the region.** Document links of RCMG conflict programs to the REDSO Population and Health and Food Security SOs and to other USAID bilateral and non-presence programs throughout East and Southern Africa. Seek operational linkages among regional and bilateral programs.

- **Communications and outreach strategy for USAID.** Develop a communications and outreach strategy for RCMG Team conflict work aimed at the other parts of the Kenya USAID Complex (both REDSO and the Kenya bilateral missions); other USAID Missions in East and Southern Africa with a particular focus on the Regional Centers for Southern and West Africa; selected Embassies in the region; and USAID/Washington.
- **Consult with and involve AFR/Washington on next steps, including a retrospective on results of REDSO's conflict work since the mid-1990s and the GHAI.** Following or concurrently with work under the communications strategy, consult with AFR/Washington and others (DCHA and PPC) on next steps with the RCMG program, perhaps as part of a mini-program review in Nairobi with regional and USAID/Washington participants (or in Washington if there is insufficient attendance in Nairobi). Contract for a retrospective study on historical results of work in conflict dating from the GHAI efforts from the mid-1990 that could result in a multi-media presentation.

C. Suggestions for Organizing Performance Monitoring work for Next year's Annual Report (2004)

- **Complete baseline and data collection.** In connection with RCMG's planned workshop in early 2003 with partners and other USAID Missions, complete the baseline work on all indicators under REDSO's Results Framework and set 2003 targets. Prior to or after the workshop, carry out field work in the conflict zones necessary for baseline and target work, especially on the SO-level indicators. This is critical to showing change and progress at the SO level.
- **Refine indicators and establish data quality with partners.** In refining indicators and data to be collected, work closely with partners in carrying out data quality assessment where needed and in choosing what valid, precise, reliable, and timely data can be collected at reasonable cost and time.
- **Train RCMG team members in performance monitoring work.** Train all members of the RCMG team who have not been trained in performance monitoring.
- **Give local partners time to collect performance data.** Plan for partners to have plenty of notice and time to provide the data for indicators that REDSO and its partners will agree on in the baseline and indicator workshop in early 2003.
- **Seek to establish a joint management team for any follow-on to the ISGM activity.** Specifically for the ISGM activity, REDSO should seek ways in which the Program Office/HASP, SO5 (Food Security) and SO6 (Conflict Management and Governance) can work jointly with PACT/MWENGO in clarifying indicators and data desired for the next Annual Report.
- **Add gender disaggregation.** Add gender considerations and gender disaggregation in indicators and data collection where possible. Solicit partner suggestions on greater attention to gender concerns.

There has been significant work on gender issues during FY 2002, such as the work by IGAD's Women Desk and the work by AU-IBAR's CAPE unit. Through the IGAD Women Desk, Ministers in Charge of Women's Affairs in the IGAD member states received training in Advanced Negotiation and Mediation skills. In 2003, to ensure that a larger number of women legislators and leaders are trained in such skills, the training courses will be held in the member states. One of AU-IBAR's success stories is the use of traditional methods in problem solving. Through peace crusades between conflicting communities, the CAPE unit engaged women as peace advocates. This proved so effective that more attention will be given to working with women in 2003. Also in 2003 there is a project targeting Somali women and among the objectives of the project is to empower women in peace, reconciliation and development.

D. RCMG contributions to USAID Missions

- **Kenya.** RCMG has provided about \$1.3 million to support conflict management activities and organizations in Kenya. Approximately one half that amount supported NGOs like the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Peacenet, which were involved in mitigating violence from previous national elections and ensuring a peaceful and successful national election in December 2002. NCCK for example, facilitated email and internet services as part of capacity building in communication during the election. Communications between electoral constituencies was reported as being swift and facilitated quick action by the national office on reported cases of violence. Peacenet addressed elections-related conflict in the Rift Valley and on the Kenya coast. A significant number of regional organizations, and NGOs working on conflict issues along the borders of Kenya and its neighbors – including Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia - have their base of operations in Kenya. During 2002, five grantees (CIFA, WASDA, NORDA, ALDEF and BYDA) supported more than 50 local community efforts in Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia to develop capacity in peace building and resolving conflicts. Through two ISGM grantees (CIFA and ALDEF), 11 communities across the borders of Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia worked towards lasting peace.
- **Uganda.** RCMG provided support for a number of different NGOs working on conflict management, including the Northeast, the North, and the Northwest. The team also provided technical assistance in analysis of the distribution of conflict along Uganda's borders which helped lead to the selection of four target areas. Another RCMG staff member assisted in selection of the consortium implementing the \$12.5 million project Community Resilience and Dialogue.
- **Rwanda.** RCMG has assisted the mission in conducting a major conflict vulnerability assessment, including arrangements for cooperation in distribution of its findings with two other donors, the US Embassy, and Rwandan Government. Several NGO activities have been funded that have focused on reconciliation for the nation, for women, and for youth.
- **Ethiopia.** RCMG has assisted in implementing a major conflict vulnerability assessment that addressed conflict issues at the national, cross-border (with an emphasis on the pastoral

areas) and regional perspectives (with an emphasis on immediate neighbors). RCMG and USAID /Ethiopia have also shared funding (\$.8 million total) for development of a Somali-language interactive radio instruction in basic math and language that includes messages of peace and reconciliation in the remote zones of East and Southeast Ethiopia.

- **Non-presence countries.** Assistance has included analytical and funding support for conflict vulnerability assessments (CVAs) for Burundi, Sudan and southern and eastern Somalia (as part of the Ethiopia CVA). *Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*, the book REDSO helped produced, contains case studies of "Coffee and Conflict in Burundi", "Oil and Water in Sudan", and "Deegaan [land] Politics and War in Somalia." Grant funding has supported testing of conflict pilot approaches, conflict quick response activities, or institutional strengthening for civil society organizations addressing conflict in all three of these countries (*see Annex 4A and 4B*). REDSO has also joined other donors in providing limited funds to IGAD in its support for the Sudan and Somalia Peace Talks.

VII. Discussion of SO Indicators in the Performance Data Table

A. SO Indicator 2: Greater frequency and coverage of efforts to manage conflict in the three targeted conflict zones

The main challenge facing the RCMG Team is to complete baseline data analysis and collection for this indicator (and SO Indicator 3). This will require significant analytic work to define the state of each of nine criteria defined in the Performance Indicator Reference Sheet for each of the three targeted conflict zones. Without this baseline data analysis, RCMG will be unable to measure, even qualitatively, the progress made at the SO level for this indicator in achieving greater frequency and coverage in conflict management in the key conflict zones.

Suggestions. The RCMG Team should consider designing a performance index to summarize progress under the criteria of this strategic objective. The team could also assign weights to these criteria depending on the relative importance of each issue in contributing to progress under the indicator and consequently to the SO. The weighting of the criteria could be identified through meetings with partners and stakeholders from the conflict zones. A lotus/excel template can be designed to make subsequent evaluation exercises easy for the users who will only need to insert scores or grades of progress in the criteria, and the index would be automatically calculated by a formula. Because the values will be objective, it will be easier to ensure high data quality. Following is an example of a simplified evaluation template.⁹

Factor	Sub-factors	Actual value of sub-factor ¹⁰	Weighted value of sub-factors (c)	Weight for the factor (d)	Weighted value for factor (e)
<i>A Stakeholders workshop could be used to select the most useful factors to consider and the relative importance of each factor toward achieving the SO</i>	<i>Stakeholders workshop also selects the sub factors to consider and the relative importance (weight) of each sub factor toward achieving the factor</i>	<i>Actual value. The only input to be made on the template</i>	<i>Calculated by assigning weights to each sub-factor and multiplying to the actual values</i>	<i>A constant determined in a stakeholders workshop</i>	<i>e= d x c</i>
Early warning systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of CEWERUs set up Number of EW data reports disseminated Number of EW analysis reports disseminated 	<div>3</div> <div>5</div> <div>2</div>	4 (these are arbitrary for purpose of illustration)	0.3	1.2
Networking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of networks Number of entities participating in networks Number of different communications channels Etc. 	<div>3</div> <div>7</div> <div>2</div> <div>Etc.</div>	5 (these are arbitrary for purpose of illustration)	0.5	2.5
<i>Etc.</i>					
INDEX (Total of all the weighted values (c))					INDEX

⁹ The index can also be made as a percentage in order to report percentage of coverage at any point in time.

¹⁰ The shaded area is the only column where the evaluator would need to provide input. All other values would be either predetermined constants or calculations worked out within the template.

B. SO Indicator 3: Mitigation of some factors driving conflict in the target conflict zones

Here again, the RCMG team must complete baseline data analysis, preferably with its partners, according to the performance indicator reference sheet. The first step would be the identification of factors driving conflict in the targeted conflict zones and the means of measuring change or "mitigation" of these factors over time. Annual exercises would take place with partners to determine the degree to which the factors driving conflict in the targeted zones have changed.

Suggestions. Like SO Indicator discussed above, the use of a performance index based on the results of the qualitative analysis could enable the RCMG Team to present changes under SO Indicator 3. The index could measure key mitigating factors for the three different zones and also take into consideration the changing environmental forces (for instance the actions of traditional elders can play an important mitigating role in one year or in a particular zone but change in importance in subsequent years). The suggested performance data table below could summarize the progress made in both these SO-level indicators.

Suggested Performance Data Table for SO 6.2 and 6.3

Strategic Objective 6: More Effective Management of Conflicts by African Organizations							
SO Indicators 2&3	Unit of measure	Zone	Baseline data	Target and Actual			
			2001	2002		2003	
				Target	Actual	Target	Actual
SO Indicator 2: Greater frequency/ coverage of efforts to manage conflict in the three target zones	Performance Index	Target zone 1					
		Target zone 2					
		Target Zone 3					
SO Indicator 3: Mitigation of some factors driving conflict in the target conflict zones	Performance Index	Target Zone 1					
		Target Zone 2					
		Target Zone 3					

Annex 1: Persons and Organizations Contacted

<u>Name</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Position</u>
Ned Greeley	USAID/REDSO	Chief, RCMG
Leonora Foley	USAID/REDSO	Democracy Fellow
Njeri Karuru	USAID/REDSO	Regional Conflict Advisor, RCMG
John Munuve	USAID/REDSO	Regional Conflict Advisor, RCMG
Steve Smith	USAID/REDSO	Regional Conflict Advisor, RCMG
Rosalind Wanyagi	USAID/REDSO	Project Management Assistant.
Josphat Wachira	USAID/REDSO	ICT Program Development Officer
Charles Ward	USAID/REDSO	Project Manager, HASP
Shirley Erves	USAID/REDSO	Regional Development Impact Advisor
Florence Omosa	PACT/MWENGO	Deputy Chief of Party
Lynn McCoy	PACT	Technical Advisor
Tim Leyland	AU-IBAR	Head of CAPE unit
Ochieng Adala	APFO	Project Officer
Bubelwa Kaiza	FORDIA	Executive Director
Samuel Kabue	NCCK	Director of Programs
Harriet Kongin	NCCK	Program Officer – NAP
Sarah Muhoya	NCCK	Program Officer – Communications

Annex 2: Performance Data Table

USAID/REDSO Regional Conflict Management and Governance Office SO6

SO or IR	Results Statement	Indicator	Unit of Measure	Disaggregation	Baseline		Target		Target		Frequency of data	Method of acquisition	Method of acquisition
					Yr	Val	2002	Val	2003	Val			
SO6 Indic. 2	More Effective Management of Conflict by African Organizations	Greater frequency/ coverage of efforts to manage conflict in the three target/ conflict zones	Narrative description	Conflict zones	2001	0	0	0	TBD		2001, 2003, 2005	TBD	MSI contract, TBD
SO 6 Indic. 3	Same as above	Mitigation of some factors driving conflict in the target conflict zones	List of factors	Conflict zones	2001	0	0	0	TBD		2004 or 2005 periodicity to be reviewed	TBD	TBD
IR 6.1 Indic. 1	Capacity of African-owned conflict management organizations strengthened	Number of target organizations showing change on the index of organizational strengthening developed by PACT/MWENGO (OCAT)	Median score (Full OCA score)	By Category	2001	1.7	N/A	N/A	2.4-3.5		Beginning and end of grant period: 2000, 2003	Progress reports	PACT/ Mwengo, TBD
IR 6.1 Indic. 2	Same as above	Number of target organizations showing change on the progress assessment index of organizational strengthening developed by PACT/MWENGO (OCAT)	Median score (mini-OCA)	By Category	2001	2.0	2.0-2.9	2.4	N/A		Annually except beginning and end of grant period: 2001, 2002	Progress reports	PACT/Mwengo
IR 6.1 Indic. 4b	Same as above	Number of CMG training courses conducted annually	Number of training course by target organizations	By conflict zone (denomination is outside zone)	2001	2/0	3/1	11/0	11/1		Annual	Progress reports	PACT/ Mwengo
IR 6.2 Indic. 1a	Expanded application of effective approaches in managing conflicts	Number of target groups applying an effective approach in one of three cross-border areas	Number of target groups (group only counted once irrespective of number of approaches or zones applied)	Conflict zones	2001	5	5	11	16		Annual	Reports	
IR 6.2 Indic. 1b	Same as above	Number of target groups applying an effective approach outside the three border zones	Number of targeted groups (partner organizations)	By type of effective approach	2001	11	5	10	3		Annual	Partner reports	RCMG

SO or IR	Results Statement	Indicator	Unit of Measure	Disaggregation	Baseline		Target		Target		Frequency of data	Method of acquisition	Method of acquisition
					Yr	Val	2002	Val	2003	Val			
IR 6.2 Indic. 1 c/d/e	Same as above	Number of target groups applying an effective approach in a cross-border zone	Number of target group applying a type of approach (with 3 the maximum) in a zone (One target group can apply up to 3 different approaches in each zone)	Conflict zone (denominator is outside zone)	2001	5/12	5/5	18/15	17/3		Annual	Internal records of primary organizations	PACT/Mwengo
IR6.2 Indic. 2	Same as above	Case studies of the extent to which the applications meet quality criteria in the 3 zones.	Case studies	Approaches	2001	8	0	0	2		Annual	Assessment	
IR 6.2 Indic. 3	Same as above	Number of publications (CVAs, books, reports and analysis) disseminated broadly	Number of publications	Actual publication	2001	2	1	5	4		Annual	Progress Reports	
IR 6.3 Indic. 1	Increased Networking among CMG Stakeholders	Adoption of formal instruments for CSOs to affiliate with intergovernmental bodies addressing CMG	Number of protocols, rules and procedures	COMESA, IGAD, EAC	2000	0	2	3	5		Report annually until achieved	Progress Reports	COMESA, IGAD, EAC
IR 6.3 Indic. 4a	Same as above	Percentage of Network members connected to internet	Percent	Network	2001						Annual	Survey	Partners and USAID
IR 6.3 Indic. 4b	Same as above	Targeted network members with a CPMR website updated in the last 12 months	Percent	Number of organizations	2001	4	3	2	4		Annual	Survey	Partners and USAID

Annex 3: Success Stories (provided by the organizations listed)

A. Africa Peace Forum Organization (APFO)

Institution Building. The USAID-sponsored institutional strengthening training provided to APFO, started in 2000, has had impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of APFO. Through the assistance, APFO was able to hire a qualified accountant. This played a role in donor confidence and helped APFO in fundraising. An administration manager was also brought on, who not only freed the technical staff to concentrate in technical issues but has been instrumental in ensuring that the programs went on as planned. Finally, a program officer was added to the staff, reducing the administrative burden on existing technical staff.

“We are indebted to USAID/PACT for the organizational capacity assessment ... the OCA highlighted our deficiencies and have caused us to look at ourselves critically... we look forward to your assisting us overcome our areas of weakness. If one is not ready to accept their mistakes they can never advance....”

- Chief Executive, APFO

USAID, through ISGM, also took APFO through several cases such as networking, proposal writing, communications etc – which have played a role in resource mobilization and networking among other key skills. PACT also assisted APFO in designing a five-year strategic plan which is expected to help the organization focus on activities and provide a resource mobilization tool.

The USAID-sponsored strategic plan retreat (early 2001) brought together some of APFO partners, providing APFO with an opportunity to mobilize partners (People for Peace in Africa, Nairobi Peace Initiative, Norwegian Church Aid and All Africa Conference of Churches) to form the “Partnership for Peace.” The Partnership for Peace (which later brought on board other organizations) worked towards peaceful elections, transition, and advocacy for a constitutional review process in Kenya. The initial aim of the partnership was to work together towards peaceful 2002 elections and transition due to tribal clashes and violence in previous multiparty general elections (1992 and 1997). The first activity of the group was hosting a landmark workshop that brought together senior officials from law enforcement, media and civil society, to explore collaborative approaches. Getting these organizations to recognize that they needed each other, if peace and security was to become a reality in Kenya, was indeed a huge step. For the first time, civil society organizations gained access to law enforcement and vice-versa (the police requested APFO to conduct research for them on crime and insecurity). The police also agreed to a proposal to hold these meetings countrywide. The media agreed to carry less sensational articles contributing to escalation of violence and to report on law enforcement in a fair light.

COMESA Parliamentarian Workshops. USAID-sponsored workshops (conducted by APFO) took place in Seychelles, Nairobi and Lusaka. A total of over 60 parliamentarians from the ruling party and opposition participated.

In all three workshops, the participants expressed that the material had more than exceeded their expectations and urged COMESA to ensure that the courses would be held on a regular basis and target a wider audience of parliamentarians (the workshops accommodated only three parliamentarians from each country). Several other recommendations were made by the

parliamentarians, as well. For instance, in all three workshops, the parliamentarians recognized the need for networking among themselves, networks that could see parliamentarians playing a greater role in regional conflict resolution.

One parliamentarian, however, captured the thoughts of the others in regard to the training, when he, on behalf of the Ugandan delegation sent an email to the sponsors, conveners and facilitators extending his appreciation to COMESA and USAID/REDSO and urging APFO to share its knowledge more widely among other parliamentarians:

“...To the financiers – USAID, I have no doubt that you appreciate the role of parliamentarians...to facilitators, APFO please share your knowledge with as many parliamentarians as possible I urge you to get in touch with our parliamentary commission for a visit.”

- Ugandan Parliamentarian

CEWARN: Early in 2002, IGAD adopted the Khartoum Declaration for the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning Mechanism. IGAD, with support from USAID and the GTZ commission on the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, are proceeding with a feasibility study. This process began in 2000 with a team of 12 consultants. APFO provided the team leader (APFO Executive Director) and the moderator (APFO Director of Programs). A number of workshops and consultations were held across the sub-region to provide feedback on the proposed framework and to ensure that the model incorporated the views of both state and non-state actors. In August 2001, state and civil society participants from the sub-region met in Ethiopia to develop mechanisms for responding to conflicts along the pastoral area borders. Out of this meeting, the role of civil society in providing early warning information was highlighted. Efforts and achievements of APFO in the region have been further recognized with the recent appointment of APFO Executive Director as the Special Envoy to the IGAD sponsored Somali Peace Process.

Great Lakes Early Warning Network: The Great Lakes Early Warning Network met during 2002, bringing together 20 organizations from seven countries, specifically, Rwanda (2), Burundi (2), Democratic Republic of Congo (2), Tanzania (3), Uganda (2), Sudan (3) and Kenya (7). There were also representatives from both northern and southern Sudan (not currently members of the network), the result being consideration to include Sudan in the Network. The Network was able to set an agenda for 2003 and identified priority areas, including capacity building and information sharing.

B. ISGM: Institutional Strengthening is Making A Difference

ISGM staff regularly witnessed the application and impact of the capacity building efforts within the grantee organizations. Examples of these impacts are demonstrated below:

ISGM grantees – helping communities create peace: USAID has stated that the Greater Horn of Africa will not be a secure region until Africans and their organizations have the capabilities to direct the process. During 2002, five grantees (CIFA, WASDA, NORDA, ALDEF and BYDA) supported more than 50 local community efforts in Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia to develop capacity in peace building and resolving conflicts. Along the Kenyan / Ethiopian border, four communities created environmental management committees to handle the resource based conflicts common among pastoral border groups. CIFA supported these four groups and two others by sponsoring training in conflict resolution and land-use management skills. Elsewhere along this border, NORDA identified 15 traditional peace committees on the Kenyan side of the border and 15 traditional peace committees on the Ethiopian side and began a process to train these existing committees with skills on how to manage and prevent cross-border conflicts relating to land, pasture and water. Along the Somalia / Kenyan border, six communities created peace committees and were supported by WASDA in developing their conflict prevention and management skills. In Southern Sudan, stakeholders from six counties identified causes of conflicts in their areas and crafted action plans to build and maintain peace in the counties (supported by BYDA). ALDEF focused on helping to bring peace building skills along the Somali Kenyan border in five communities. These five grantees will continue their efforts during 2003.

ISGM grantees – brokering peace in the region: Due in part to the diligent efforts of two ISGM grantees, 11 communities across the borders of Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia are working towards lasting peace. The Marsabit Peace Committee (a group trained in conflict management by CIFA) facilitated reconciliatory meetings among the communities of Gabra and Shangilla (along the Kenyan Ethiopian border) while the Moyale Peace Committee (also supported by CIFA) conducted a similar effort for the communities of Torbi and Rawan. ALDEF supported dialogue and mediation meetings on arms trafficking, internal conflicts, and business rivalry involving Argani and Konton communities in Kenya and the Marihan, Khorof-Harar, Qarsa and Riba communities in Somalia. ALDEF also intervened with a rapid response meeting between clans in Gerrily and Khorof-Harar to resolve conflict emerging over grazing grounds.

ISGM CPMR – scaling up knowledge: During 2002, ISGM sponsored a regional meeting of CPMR trainers and began a process to develop a much needed training curricula and manual specifically by and for trainers in the Greater Horn of Africa Region. The module, (created in part by having regional field practitioners contribute chapters), includes: 1) How to assess a conflict situation, 2) How to identify entry points into the situation, and includes tools relevant to addressing the type of conflict identified. Once the module is completed, a series of three to four workshops will be offered where trainers will train other trainers throughout the region – the goal being widespread knowledge in methods for CPMR.

NGOs unite in efforts to harmonize cross-border trade: During 2002, LEAT/Tanzania utilized ISGM funding to unite with GreenWatch/Uganda to begin research for developing an

advocacy platform to address the harmonization of food security policies for trans-national boundary resources (areas usually high in resource-based conflict).

ISGM grantees use new capacities to leverage \$1.2+ million USD: The skills acquired in institutional strengthening activities continue to pay off in a very literal sense for ISGM grantees. During 2002, grantees leveraged \$1,268,384.00 (USD) from non-USAID donors as a direct result of their participation in the ISGM program; bringing the total to \$2,079,212 (USD).

The Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT) attributed \$668,000 USD (obligated in 2002) for programs from four separate donors (NOVIB, Blacksmith Institute, WRI and e-LAW), a direct result of their ISGM institutional strengthening.

“Prior to ISGM we had no plan or strategy for mobilizing resources. Now our board members and staff have the confidence and the skills to successfully raise funds”
- LEAT

BYDA was successful in attracting \$272,000 (USD) from five donors (CORDAID, UNICEF, Canadian AID, and Catholic Relief Services). BYDA cites the ISGM-supported resource mobilization strategy, combined with improved financial management systems, as key reasons donors are supporting their efforts in Southern Sudan.

Community Initiatives in Food Security (CIFA) leveraged \$110,256 USD from three donors (Farm Africa, KARI and CORDAID) for projects they identified by using community needs analysis skills taught through ISGM improved service delivery programs.

WASDA received \$47,436 USD from one donor (CORDAID) to continue water management activities begun under ISGM.

VETWORKS has been able to leverage an additional \$18,000 for animal vaccination and control programs from one donor (BSF/Belgium) which it attributes to the skills learned in the ISGM program.

“With ISGM’s help we’ve made it”
- Vetworks Director

ISGM: results scale up – way up: One critical assumption of ISGM and REDSO’s SO6 is that helping up-and-coming African NGOs will result in the expansion of support to other NGOs in the region providing a snowball effect to support for communities with food security and conflict resolution programs and needs. One indicator of the success of this approach is the number of organizations being reached through the ISGM program. To date ISGM has provided grants and support to 22 regional organizations; the grantees have in turn trained or mentored 284 community groups and or regional organizations (in 2002 alone the grantees reached 33 food security groups, 19 CPMR groups, and four umbrella organizations). Additionally, ISGM has provided mentoring or skill building to another 241 separate organizations (in 2002, ISGM reached 25 food security groups, 19 CPMR groups, and 61 umbrella organizations), this means that to date, 558 organizations (across all ten GHA countries), have benefited from the USAID funded programming.

During 2002, the type of capacity building and skills training offered by grantees included:

- best practices in rainwater harvesting;
- water management and small scale water development practices;
- community animal health practices;
- livestock emergency intervention practices;
- environmental law;
- crop dissemination practices and pilot farming;
- administrative and financial management;
- leadership and governance;
- strategic planning;
- assessing legal and institutional arrangements for natural resources and food security; and
- participatory rural appraisal.

ISGM mentors or facilitators additionally provided training and skill building in strategic planning; resource mobilization; proposal writing; project development; information and communication technologies; pastoralist and community animal health care networking; conflict, prevention mitigation and response; leadership and governance; financial management, oversight and systems; and environmental impact assessment and networking.

C. ISGM: Notable Field Achievements/Results for 2002

Grantee	Countries of Operation	Total Area Covered using ISGM support	Total Population Served	Notable FIELD Achievements/Results for 2002
1) Community Initiative Facilitation Assistance (CIFA)	Ethiopia, Kenya (Marsabit, Moyale area)	50,300 sq km	264,000 people	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Guided Marsabit District Peace Committee to develop a constitution and assisted them to elect office bearers. ➤ Supported the formation and training of 6 environmental management committees' conflict resolution skills relating to pasture and water resources. ➤ Facilitated 2 reconciliatory meetings among communities – Marsabit Peace Committee met with communities in Gabra and Shangilla, and Moyale Peace Committee met with communities in Torbi and Rawan. ➤ Supported 6 meetings on cross-border collaboration in Kenya and Ethiopia. ➤ Leveraged \$110,256 USD from three non-USAID donors for field programs.
2) Wajir South Development Association (WASDA)	Lower Juba in Somalia, Wajir South in North Eastern Kenya	35,000 sq. km.	64,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Supported the formation and training of 7 peace committees. ➤ Trained and supported 4 environmental management committees in conflict resolution relating to pasture and water resources. ➤ Rehabilitated 2 boreholes hence reducing congestion and subsequent conflicts around other water points. ➤ Leveraged \$47,4367 USD from one non-USAID donor for field programs.
3) ALDEF	Somalia, Kenya	TBD	TBD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Facilitated dialogue and mediation meetings on arms trafficking, internal conflicts and business rivalry. Involved communities from Argani and Konton in Kenya and Marihan and Khorof-Harar Qarsa and Riba in Somalia. ➤ Began peace training process with the aim of equipping communities along the Kenyan/Somalia border with peace building skills ➤ Rapid response meeting between clans in Gerriley and Khorof Harar to resolve conflict emerging over grazing grounds and rivalry in business
4) NORDA	Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya	TBD	TBD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Identified 15 traditional peace committees on Kenyan side and 15 on Ethiopian side of the border (representing villages along the border) ➤ Worked with Women for Peace and Development (WFPD) to train the committees on how to manage and prevent cross-border issues on land, pasture, water, etc.
5) BYDA	South Sudan	Awerial, Cueibet, Mvolo, Rumbek, Tonj and Yirol Counties	TBD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Facilitated six counties in Southern Sudan to meet and identify causes of conflicts amongst them. Each county then developed action plans to build and maintain peace in each county.

Grantee	Countries of Operation	Total Area Covered using ISGM support	Total Population Served	Notable FIELD Achievements/Results for 2002
6) Africa Peace Forum (APFO)	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda	Network covering countries of operation	Member organizations	➤ Regional stakeholders developed a work-plan on how to collect and analyze conflict related/early warning (e.g. data on increased violence, military personnel, etc)
7) Participatory Ecological Land Use Management Association (PELUM)	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia	Network of 14 NGOs in Kenya, 7 in Uganda, 3 in Tanzania and one in Eritrea that are working with CBOs on food security	14 Member organizations	➤ Held a consultative meeting with 41 participants (25 from Kenya, 9 from Tanzania and 9 from Uganda) from 33 NGOs and developed action plans for each NGO that included (for some NGOS) action for mitigating conflicts that impact on food security.
8) Lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT)	Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda	Network of national organizations including Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) in Kenya and Greenwatch in Uganda	3 districts in Uganda (Rakai, Masaka & Tororo), 1 Uganda Kenya cross-border region (Busia) & two districts in Tanzania (Kagera and Arusha)	➤ Commissioned case studies to identify how legal regimes governing trans-boundary natural resources management impact on food security in the three East African countries (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). Results of the case studies will be used to develop a protocol and advocacy strategy to be signed by the three countries (through the East African Community) on harmonizing legal and institutional arrangements for the management of cross-border natural resources and food security ➤ Leveraged \$668,000 USD from four non-USAID donors for field programs.
9) NSCC	Uganda, Sudan, Kenya. (No IS component)	Peace groups in southern Sudan and region	TBD	➤ Outlined training module for how to conduct people to people peace process ➤ Scaling up ability for radio program on peace issues in southern Sudan

Grantee	Countries of Operation	Total Area Covered using ISGM support	Total Population Served	Notable FIELD Achievements/Results for 2002
10) NCCK	Uganda, Kenya (No IS component)	Church supported peace efforts in U, T K	TBD	➤ Conducted stakeholders workshop with members of the interfaith initiative, identified program outline for establishing new and strengthening existing community peace structures and creating awareness and action on issues around conflict and peace building
11) RECONCILE	Kenya, Uganda, Tz, and part of Rwanda	Eastern Africa region	Regional coverage	No field activities under ISGM for 2002, Activities related to institutional strengthening
12) FAN	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia	All four countries		No field activities under ISGM for 2002, Activities related to institutional strengthening
13) RWN	Completed all grant activities prior to the recording period			
14) CECORE	Completed all grant activities prior to the recording period			
15) FIDA	Completed all grant activities prior to the recording period			
16) AAYMCA	Completed all grant activities prior to the recording period			

D. ADRA Rwanda: Outdoor Adventure Therapy Project

Background: ADRA Rwanda has been operating an Outdoor Adventure Therapy Project for 18 months. The first phase was a six-month pilot project in the spring of 2001, followed by a second phase in 2002 – the implementation of the “Outdoor Experiential Therapy Pilot Project” (funded by USAID with a budget of \$200,000 USD). A third phase of the project is now being planned to operate a training facility for two years. An outdoor adventure therapy program will be held to help individuals traumatized by conflict, contributing to the nationwide endeavor for restructuring the social fabric of the Rwandan community.

Outdoor Adventure Therapy Concept and Results: The concept of outdoor-based therapy is designed to promote teamwork, trust and self-worth by teaching conflict management, coping skills, and problem solving skills through outdoor activities. The strategy has shown to be a powerful vehicle for personal transformation through the stimulation of participants’ mental, emotional and physical potential. Outdoor activities and group work provide the opportunity for conflict-resolution, values clarification, self-awareness and social skills by confronting the participants with situations that challenge them to analyze their own feelings, experiences and decisions.

This concept of adventure therapy is considered to have a significantly refined rate of retention in participants compared to isolated forms of counseling or treatment. By “doing” participants remember the lessons learned and the success achieved during the program. During the pilot phase, all participants retained conflict resolution principles at a rate of 78% more than three months after the program. One group was tested more than 18 months after the pilot project in 2001 and was found to have a retention rate of 73% (without interaction from counselors or staff members). Post Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms decreased anywhere from 5% to 10% in the participants attending the program. Approximately 25% of the participants were able to reconcile with their families or communities and returned to their homes from the streets or centers where they were living. As a result of this program, sixty youth transitioned from orphanages into their own homes, re-integrating into their communities.

Beneficiaries: Many children in Rwanda have missed out on a part of their childhood. Some have had to assume adult roles within the family when a parent was lost or withdrawn. The transient refugee lifestyle of others has prevented a stable or secure environment for normal social development.

Gender

One of the independent variables to assess is that of the participants’ gender. The table shows the number of males and females entering the program. The program attempts to keep an equal amount of male/female participants, however, sometimes this is not

	Aug	Sept	Oct	Total
Females	22	40	9	71
Males	32	49	48	129
Total	54	89	57	200

Gender (Aug-Oct '02)

possible. Many of the youth living on the street are male. This is typical in Rwandan culture, as girls or young women are often valued more highly in their homes as domestic workers. They are not encouraged to leave the home for education, jobs, or other opportunities. Males, however, are usually told to leave home at a young age and find employment to support the family. Thus,

most of the boys who are on their own end up trying to earn a living on the streets. When the police put these youth into custody, there is an over-representation of boys.

Age

Age is one of the variables in the research study. The program attempts to train youth between the ages of 14 and 21 years (see table to the right). There are a few participants <10 years old, and few >21.

The youngest participant to ever attend the program (except for the mothers with babies) had just turned eight years old.

Unfortunately, he was unable to grasp most of the activities, and could not reach most of the activities. He was too

immature to think for himself, and too physically small to participate in any other way. When asked questions in the classes, he usually burst into tears. He and his sister were orphans, whose parents had died from AIDS. This and other scenarios have shown us that children under the age of 14 usually do not understand the principles and concepts taught; and/or that they are physically unable to participate in the athletic activities. The program could be adapted for smaller/younger children if needed in the future.

	Aug 2002	Sept 2002	Oct 2002	Total
8-10 years	-	2	-	2
11-13 years	9	13	-	22
14-15 years	16	16	11	43
16-18 years	11	32	28	71
19-21 years	11	19	13	43
22-25 years	7	7	5	19
Total	54	89	57	200


Age Groups (Aug-Oct '02)

Provinces

Kigali is the most populated province in Rwanda.

Therefore, the majority of the children who attend the program are from this province. However, for research purposes, the program is attempting to get an approximate sample of youth from each province. When the program began, it was assumed

that nearly 40 youth from each province would be able to attend. However, scheduling difficulties and logistics of travel limited the number of youth able to participate from the far-reaching provinces. The number decreased from 40 children per province to 20 children per province for the fourth quarter. As seen in the graph above, 200 youth attended the program from seven provinces in just one quarter. The remaining five provinces had participants in previous quarters or will be targeted in the final quarter of this project (Nov 2002-Jan 2003).



E. CAPE: Achievements in Conflict Management
(from July-Dec 2002 Progress Report)

Event	Date	Location	Communities Involved	No of People Involved	No of Animals Involved	Details
Handover of Calves	5/7/2002-5/7/2002	Lokoriam, Turkana Kenya	Turkana Matheniko	1000-2000	47 cattle	Return of calves stolen by Turkana youths about two months previously. Turkana administrators kept the cattle
Follow up Natamakarwo Elders Peace Meeting	22/7/2002-31/7/2002	Lotikippi plains, Turkana District, Kenya	Kwatella-Turkana	5000	None	Background was - two groups of Kwatella - one pro and one anti peace. The chiefs requested the CAPE Unit to thrash out the differences between the group. The anti-peace group would usually steal animals from Toposa land to repudiate peace. Actually it turned out to be a political group against FORD Kenya and wanted to spread the conflict across the border so that FORD would not be credited with the peace work.
Donkey Handover in Moroto	5/8/2002-6/8/2002	Rupa, Moroto District, Uganda	Matheniko Turkana	1500	17 donkeys	A reciprocal arrangement for the return of the livestock. The donkeys had been stolen by the Ngirengerchpai (notorious Matheniko) raiders.
Nanam Focal Meeting	16/9/02-18/09/2002	Nanam, Lokichoggio Division, Kenya	Toposa Turkana	135	None	Purpose was to plan to for how Turkana and Toposa can graze along their shared border without conflict. The meeting is where the communities decided to bury the hatchet.
Nadapal Burying of the Hatchet	1/10/2002-6/10/2002	Nadapal, S. Sudan	Toposa Turkana	1100	None	Burying the instruments of war as a sign of complete peace
Turkana Women's Peace Crusade to Pokot	25/10/02-7/11/2002	Kasitet, West Pokot, Kenya	Turkana West Pokot East Baringo Pokot	43	None	The first of the women's peace crusades by the Turkana women traveling through the grazing areas of W. Pokot delivering messages of peace to the Pokot youth, elders and women as well as Pokot administrators.
Follow up for Hatchet Burial	28/10/02-10/11/2002	Lotikippi plains, Mogila ranges and Somot ranges, Kenya	Kwatella-Turkana	5000	None	Purpose was to publicize to the youths that the elders of Turkana and Toposa have already buried the hatchet (1 October - 4 October). There was also a need to release the tension among the Turkana so that no

Event	Date	Location	Communities Involved	No of People Involved	No of Animals Involved	Details
						revenge was taken against the Toposa who made a raid in August. This was the first counter-raid in five years, just at the time that the two groups were going to bury the hatchet.
Return of Cattle in Lokichoggio	12/11/2002	Lokichoggio, Kenya	Turkana Toposa	30	4 cattle	These animals were returned as part of the Nadapal agreement and were actually a fine against Turkana thieves for spoiling the ceremony of the burying of the hatchet and this should be publicized to other youths. The fine was in spite of the fact that the 6 cattle were returned. It was supposed to be 12 - i.e. 2 cows for each cattle stolen. They did not turn over the thieves to the police as provided for in the agreement.
Return of Cattle at Oropoi	6/12/2002	Oropoi, Kenya/Uganda border	Turkana Dodoth	255	11 cattle	Cattle were stolen by the Turkana youths one month previously. Turkana elders wanted to organize the return of the cattle in order to maintain the peace in their area to access grazing lands and the Dodoth have already returned 504 cattle.

F. National Council of Churches and the December 2002 Kenya Elections

A week before the 2002 general elections (Kenya), the National Council of Churches of Kenya NCCCK was provided with email and internet services as part of capacity building in communication especially during the election activities.

The support to NCCCK was in the form of computers and printers to the head office and nine regional offices throughout the country. In addition, three regional offices and the head office were provided with email/internet services. The three regional offices are in Nyeri Town for Central Region, Kisumu City for Nyanza Region and Mombasa City for Coast Region.

Initially most communication to the head office and vice versa has been mainly through courier and telephone services. This is time consuming, expensive and at times unreliable. Although these services were provided close to the general election date, the three regions that benefited from the services reported that communication to the head office was easier, faster, cheaper and convenient. For example information from one of the electoral constituencies (Gachoka Constituency) that witnessed a lot of electoral violence reached the head office almost immediately the constituency observers gave the information to the regional office in Nyeri town. This facilitated quick action by the national office on the reported cases.

NCCCK being one of the partners in the Kenya Domestic Observation Programme (K-DOP) is currently involved in finalizing the report of the observation exercise as well as in monitoring the post election period. The email and internet services are therefore helpful in ensuring timely reports from the three regions as well as providing timely information from the head office to these regional offices. The NCCCK head office has also benefited from the quick and efficient communication to other K-DOP partners and the K-DOP national secretariat.

Annex 4A: ISGM – PACT FILES DATA

Organization	Countries of Operation	Location of Field Office	Grant Start Date	Grant End Date	Comments
AFRICAN PEACE FORUM ORGANIZATION (APFO)	Kenya Uganda Tanzania Sudan Rwanda Burundi	Nairobi	<u>RFA2</u> March 2001	<u>RFA2</u> Feb. 2003	Subject of Grant: Early warning/response system for conflict identification and management
COMMUNITY INITIATIVE FACILITATION AND ASSISTANCE (CIFA)	Ethiopia Kenya	Marsabit & Moyale	<u>RFA2</u> Nov. 2000 <u>RFA3</u> Aug. 2002	<u>RFA2</u> Feb. 2003 <u>RFA3</u> June 2003	<u>RFA2</u> - Subject of Grant: Facilitating sustainable development in pastoralist Borana rangelands of Kenya and Ethiopia through increasing management skills and food security techniques for CBOs <u>RFA3</u> – Subject of Grant: Expansion of cross-border peace committees and community animal health program
BAHR EL GAZAL YOUTH DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (BYDA)	South Sudan	Nairobi & Sudan	<u>RFA2</u> Nov. 2000 <u>RFA3</u> Sept. 2002	<u>RFA2</u> Oct. 2001 <u>RFA3</u> June 2003	<u>RFA2</u> – Subject of Grant: BYDA 's institutional strengthening to enable it to accomplish its mission of establishing a peaceful Sudan <u>RFA3</u> - Subject of Grant: Facilitating grassroots communities and peace committees in Tonj, Cueibet, Rumbek, and Yirol counties to manage, reduce and prevent inter-community conflicts. Includes civil education for these communities, middle level and national leaders and institutions
FOREST ACTION NETWORK (FAN)	Kenya Uganda Tanzania Ethiopia	Nairobi	<u>RFA1</u> Oct. 1999	<u>RFA1</u> March 2002	Subject of Grant: Develop conflict management skills of communities and stakeholders through advocacy, strengthening of local indigenous management structures and other participatory methods of managing their resources sustainably.
PARTICIPATORY ECOLOGICAL LANDS USE MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION (PELUM)	Kenya Uganda Eritrea Ethiopia Tanzania Sudan Rwanda	Thika	<u>RFA2</u> April 2002	<u>RFA2</u> June 2003	Subject of Grant: Strengthening of food security network NB: During one of the ISGM-sponsored regional workshops, PELUM members identified conflict as one of the causes of food insecurity in their countries. Each member country developed an action plan to address the conflicts.

Organization	Countries of Operation	Location of Field Office	Grant Start Date	Grant End Date	Comments
RESOURCE CONFLICT INSTITUTE (RECONCILE)	Kenya Uganda Tanzania and part of Rwanda	Nakuru	<u>RFA2</u> April 2002	<u>RFA2</u> June 2003	Subject of Grant: Management and policy of water resources in pastoral areas of East Africa
RWANDA WOMEN NET (RWN)	Rwanda	Kigali	<u>RFA2</u> Nov. 2000	<u>RFA2</u> Nov. 2001	Subject of Grant: Institutional strengthening of RWN to enable it accomplish its mission of empowering Rwandese women to be active participants in the development of their country
WAJIR SOUTH DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (WASDA)	Somalia Kenya	Wajir	<u>RFA2</u> Nov. 2000 <u>RFA3</u> Aug. 2002	<u>RFA2</u> Nov. 2002 <u>RFA3</u> June 2003	<u>RFA2</u> - Subject of Grant: To improve animal health, provide pastoral communities with water and to reduce conflict related to natural resources, banditry and environmental destruction in Wajir South (Kenya) and Afmadow (Sothorn Somalia). The grant is in the close out process. <u>RFA3</u> – Expand same activities as above
ARID LAND DEVELOPMENT FOCUS (ALDEF)			<u>RFA3</u> Aug 2002	<u>RFA 3</u> June 2003	Subject of Grant: Expand community animal health program
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF KENYA (NCCK)			<u>RFA3</u> Oct 2002	<u>RFA 3</u> June 2003	Subject of Grant: Promote interfaith conflict resolution efforts in the Karamoja cluster
NEW SUDAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (NSCC)			<u>RFA3</u> Oct 2002	<u>RFA3</u> June 2003	Subject of Grant: Develop a training module to disseminate their innovative people to people peace process
NORTHERN REGION DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (NORD)			<u>RFA3</u> Aug. 2002	<u>RFA3</u> June 2003	Subject of Grant: Expand community animal health program

Annex 4B: CPAF/CQUICK ACTIVITIES

	Organization	Grant Title	Countries of Operation	Location of Field Office	Grant Start Date	Grant End Date
1	CARE – Burundi	Managing conflict over access of use of natural resources	Burundi	Bujumbura	04/30/02	07/30/02
2	Ethiopian Youth League	Youth Conference on Ethiopia/Eritrea border war	Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	07/21/99	07/24/99
3	Education Development Centre	Interactive radio program for Region 5	Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	08/10/01	07/31/03
4	National Council of Churches of Kenya	Community peace building and reconciliation development project	Kenya	Eldoret	09/29/00	09/28/02
5	PeaceNet – NGO Council	Promotion of peace and reconciliation at community level	Kenya	Nairobi	05/01/01	08/31/01
6	Friends of Nomads (FONI)	Management of environmental resource conflict within Kenya's Ewaso Ng'iro north river system	Kenya	Isiolo	06/16/00	05/31/01
7	Intermediate Technology Development & Pastoralist Development Org. (PACODEO)	The Northern Kenya conflict resolution initiative	Kenya	Nairobi	09/29/00	09/29/01
8	Africa Peace Forum (APFO)	Capacity building workshop for the Great Lakes and Early Warning Network (GLEWN): Information Exchange project Phase II	Kenya	Nairobi	07/30/02	12/31/02
9	Wajir Peace and Development Committee	Wajir pastoralist peace project	Kenya	Wajir	09/26/01	09/25/03
10	Africa Union Bureau for Animal Resources (AU/IBAR)	Karamoja cluster border harmonization meeting	Kenya	Nairobi	10/09/02	10/09/03
11	Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA)	Advance conflict transformation course for the Horn of Africa	Kenya	Nairobi	07/29/02	04/31/03
12	Unity and Reconciliation Commission (URC)	Technical support grant	Rwanda	Kigali	02/15/00	12/31/00
13	Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)	Outdoor experiential therapy program	Rwanda	Kigali	10/15/01	11/30/02
14	USAID/RWANDA	Women as partners of peace conference	Rwanda	Kigali	06/24/00	06/30/00
15	International Rescue Committee (IRC)	National Summit	Rwanda	Kigali	09/08/00	11/08/00
16	Conflict Management Group	Conflict management skills and sustainable development: Testing a new model in Central Africa – Phase III	Rwanda	Kigali	09/01/02	02/28/03
17	Organization of African Unity/ IBAR	Karamoja cluster border harmonization meeting	Uganda/ Kenya	Nairobi	02/15/00	12/31/00

	Organization	Grant Title	Countries of Operation	Location of Field Office	Grant Start Date	Grant End Date
18	Organization of African Unity/ IBAR	IBAR/Karamoja cluster livestock sector harmonization	NE Uganda, SE Sudan, SW Ethiopia, NW Kenya	Nairobi	09/28/00	09/28/03
19	UNESCO-EAMI	East Africa Media Institute Journalist workshop - Windhoek	Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania	Nairobi	04/25/01	05/05/01
20	African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS)	Ecological sources of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: A policy research information dissemination and capacity building project	Regional	Nairobi	09/30/00	09/03/03
21	SSIA/Clark University	Promoting dialogue in Somalia/Somaliland on peace and governance	Somalia	Hargesia	04/01/01	08/31/01
22	UNICEF – SOMALIA	Building Women Rights in Somalia	Somalia	Nairobi	04/22/02	09/30/02
23	New Sudan Council of Churches	Nilotic East Bank Peace and reconciliation conference	Sudan	Nairobi	05/10/00	08/08/00
24	Horn of Africa Centre for Democracy and Development (HACDAD) I	Capacity building of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)	Sudan	Nairobi	05/01/00	08/15/00
25	Horn of Africa Centre for Democracy and Development (HACDAD) II	Briefing member states on proposed NDA restructuring	Sudan	Nairobi	01/01/00	08/15/00
26	New Sudan Council of Churches	West Bank Peace Council/ Wunlit Agreement	Sudan	Nairobi	04/26/00	06/26/00
27	Bahr-el-Gazal Youth Development Agency	Conflict resolution in Bahr-el-Gazal region of south Sudan	Sudan	Nairobi	02/15/02	05/15/02
28	RED BARNET	Reconciliation and Sensitization of Acholiland	Uganda	Kampala	10/29/99	04/30/01
29	The Diocese of Northern Uganda	Uganda/Sudan religious leaders' meeting on conflict in northern Uganda	Uganda	Kampala	10/29/99	04/30/01
30	Action for Development of Local Communities (ADOL)	Peaceful and participatory disarmament of the Karamoja	Uganda	Kampala	09/11/00	12/11/00
31	Aktion Africa Hilfe	Conflict mitigation and prevention in Obongi County Moyo District West Uganda	Uganda	Kampala	08/06/01	08/03/03
32	Karamoja Initiative for Sustainable Peace (KISP)	Cross border initiative for sustainable peace and development among the Karamoja and Pokot groupings	Uganda	Kampala	Not yet signed	
33	Uganda Joint Council of Churches (UJCC)	Cross border peace building project	Uganda	Kampala	Not yet signed	

	Organization	Grant Title	Countries of Operation	Location of Field Office	Grant Start Date	Grant End Date
34	World Vision Uganda POKATUSA	Pokatusa peace building project (Kenya/Uganda)	Uganda/Kenya	Kampala	Not yet signed	
35	University of Dar-es-Salaam	Research and education for democracy department of Dar-es-Salaam (REDET)	Tanzania	Dar-es-Salaam	02/07/02	07/07/02
36	Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (FORDIA)	Conflict prevention mitigation and response (CPMR) training for the Great Lakes region	Tanzania	Dar-es-Salaam	08/21/02	12/31/02

Annex 5: Reports used in IR 6.2 Indicator 3

- ISGM Conflict Training Manual
- The Effectiveness of Civil Society Initiatives in Controlling Violent Conflicts and Building Peace: A Study of Three Approaches in the Greater Horn of Africa, June 2001
- Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa (CEWARN book)
- Conflict Vulnerability Assessments (CVA)
 - Rwanda
 - Burundi
 - Ethiopia
 - Tanzania
 - Karamoja Cluster
- Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts
- War Destroys, Peace Nurtures: Proceedings of the 8th Congress of the International Somali Studies
- MSI Consultancy Report on RCMG program progress
- CEWARN conflict Situational report series (counted as one report)
- Study on NE Kenya/ S. Ethiopia/ S. Somalia (author: Lenora Foley, forthcoming)
- Building the Foundation for the Promotion of Women's Rights in Somalia

Annex 6: Scarcity & Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts

Edited by Jeremy Lind African Centre for Technology Studies and
Kathryn Sturman Institute for Security Studies

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Annex 7: Early Warning & Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa

Edited by Ciru Mwaura And Susanne Schmeidl

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
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Annex 8: CEWARN Information Flow Chart



Annex 9: Website Listings

In alphabetical order

ACT: <http://www.acts.or.ke>

APFO: <http://www.amaniafricka.org>

AU/IBAR: <http://www.africa-union.org/en/home.asp>

CEWARN: <http://www.igad.org>

EAC: <http://www.eachq.org>

FEWSNET: <http://www.fews.net>

GLEWN <http://www.fewer.org/greatlakes/main.html>

ISS: <http://www.iss.co.za/PUBS/BOOKS/Scarcity+Surfeit/Main.html>

PACT: <http://www.pactke.org>

USAID/AFR: <http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/conflictweb>